Minimum Wage, Informality, and Non-Compliance

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Abstract: *Using Indonesian data, we find that the minimum wage (i) increases formal sector wages, (ii) reduces economic rents for employers, (iii) increases non-compliance with minimum wages, and (iv) has an ambiguous impact on formal sector employment, depending on conflicting labor demand/supply effects. We develop an equilibrium wage-posting model based on features commonly found in developing economies – employer labor market power, imperfect compliance with minimum wages, heterogeneity of firm and worker productivity, and a large informal sector – and show that the model reproduces all these findings. We calibrate the model economy, finding that the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on output and formal sector employment is negative.*

Key Words: Minimum Wage, Informality, Non-compliance, Monopsony
JEL Classification: J38; J42; O17

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[2] We are grateful for the insightful comments and support from Ben Williams, Remi Jedwab, Susan Vroman, and Paul Carrillo. We give special thanks to Joel Rodriguez and Hiroyuki Kasahara regarding the data used in the paper. We also thank Youngwoo Rho, Peter Brummund, David Newman, Bob Rijkers, Andrew Waxman, and Maike Hohberg for many generous discussions regarding the data used in the paper. We also thank Stephen Smith, and Tony Yezer, and conference and seminar participants at the Development Tea and SAGE seminar at the George Washington University, the 2020 Jobs and Development Conference, the 2019 Georgetown Center for Economic Research Biennial Conference, the 2019 Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Conference, the 2019 Asian Econometrics Society, the 2019 North America Econometrics Society, the 2019 Asian and Australasian Society of Labour Economics Conference, and the 2019 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics. All errors are ours.

I. Introduction

Understanding the impact of minimum wages in developing countries is of significant policy interest, as the minimum wage is one of the most widely implemented labor protection measures in emerging economies.[3] However, certain features common to developing countries complicate the analysis, such as the size of the informal sector, widespread non-compliance with minimum wage laws, and monopsonistic labor markets. In addition, the literature tends to focus on one or other aspect of labor market outcomes without describing the overall impact of the minimum wage on the structure of the labor market.[4]

In this paper, we use data from Indonesia to investigate the effect of the minimum wage on labor market structure. Indonesia is an ideal case study for this research question as it has experienced considerable variation in minimum wages across space and time. Panel data at the firm and household level allow us to examine in detail the impact of minimum wage variation on labor market outcomes.

We begin by detailing the characteristics of the Indonesian labor market. We find that the formal labor market displays evidence of frictions and imperfections in that (i) most workers find jobs through connections such as family and friends, (ii) payments to workers are often less than the minimum wage, (iii) labor productivity exceeds wages paid by firms, and (iv) some informal sector workers earn more than formal sector workers. These facts suggest that frictions, monopsony power, and heterogeneous earnings in informal sector are essential for thinking about the impact of minimum wages in developing economies.

These labor market characteristics suggest that minimum wages might have an impact very different from that in a competitive labor market. In a world with monopsonistic labour markets, for instance, an increase in minimum wages may result in "no disemployment effect" (Card and Krueger (1994)) and a reduction in employer rents.

[3] About 90 percent of the 187 ILO member states implemented some sort of minimum wage regulation (ILO 2020).

[4] See Alaniz, 2011; Atlas, 2008; Card and Krueger, 1994; Comola and de Mello, 2011; Del Carpio et al., 2015; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012; Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Hohberg and Lay, 2015

As a result, we pursue two further avenues of investigation. First, using variation in minimum wages across space and time in Indonesia, and using a sample of both workers and manufacturing plants, we show that a minimum wage hike leads to (i) an increase in the wages earned by formal sector workers, (ii) a reduction of economic rents for manufacturing firms, (iii) a decrease in compliance with minimum wage laws, and (iv) competing effects regarding formal sector employment, with an increase in formal sector full-time employment and a decrease in marginal worker employment, as proxied by part-time workers. We use a variety of estimation strategies to reach these findings, including exploiting minimum wage variation across geographically proximate districts.

Second, we construct a model economy that reflects the key features of developing country labor markets also found in the case of Indonesia. We extend the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) wage-posting model (henceforth the BM model) to allow for heterogeneity in firms' productivity, in workers' formal sector skill and in workers' informal sector productivity, and to allow firms to choose whether or not to comply with minimum wage laws. Consistent with the data, the model predicts that a minimum wage hike (i) raises the entire wage distribution, (ii) decreases economic rents for monopsonistic firms, (iii) increases non-compliance with minimum wage laws, and (iv) may increase or decrease formal sector employment, depending on whether the number of workers tempted to enter formal employment due to higher wages exceeds the number rationed out at the bottom of the wage distribution.

Finally, to study the *aggregate* impact of minimum wages and to determine the impact of the minimum wage on overall employment, we calibrate the model economy to match some key statistics of the Indonesian labor market. We find that a minimum wage leads workers to enter the formal economy in search of higher wages, but also leads firms to stop hiring the lowest-productivity workers. All told, the second effect dominates, so we find that higher minimum wages tend to *decrease* the size of the formal labor market.

Our work contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the body of

research devoted to modeling the characteristics of developing economy labor markets. While numerous authors have adapted the BM model to study labour markets in developed economies [5], few have included non-compliance and the informal labor market, features which are essential for developing country analysis.[6]

Meghir et al. (2015) and Narita (2020) are an exception. Meghir et al. (2015) introduce a firm's endogenous choice between the formal and informal sectors. Our model differs in that it emphasizes the choice between formal and informal employment status. The primary alternative for small informal economic actors is wage-earning employment, not formal registration of its activity, consistent with our findings and those of Rothenberg et al. (2016). Narita (2020) explicitly models all possible transitions between self-employment and wage-earning status in the formal or informal sector. Unlike Narita (2020), we only model the transition between self-employment and employment in the formal sector for two pragmatic reasons: (1) A significant proportion of household-level and labor force surveys, including the IFLS, do not distinguish between wage workers employed by formally registered firms and those hired by unregistered informal firms. While previous research suggests that workers employed by firms under size five as wage earners in informal firms (See CSO, 1999, for example), the definition and classification of wage-earning jobs in informal firms are highly context-specific and survey-specific [7]; (2) The most frequently used proxy for the relative size of informal employment is the share of self-employment in total employment, which captures workers who, working for their own account or with a few partners or family members who support family business. (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Elgin et al., 2021). We do not define wage earners at unregistered enterprises as a distinct category due to these two practical considerations and the lack of formal registration information from IFLS data.

[5] See Cahuc et al., 2006; van den Berg and Ridden, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Jolivet et al., 2006

[6] For a model with firms' non-compliance with minimum wage regulations in the U.S. economy, see Eckstein et al (2011).

[7] Note that Narita (2020) is able to precisely define formally hired workers and informally hired workers, leading to a model of the relationships between formally hired workers, informally hired workers, and the self-employed. This is because the Brazilian monthly labour force survey - Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME) - contains data that indicates whether the worker's current job is enrolled with the Ministry of Labour.

Amongst monopsony models based on industrial organization literature, Ulyssea (2018) model the imperfect compliance of firms with labor regulations. However, the paper does not contain a mechanism that explains the movement of the entire wage distribution along with minimum wage, as reported in Cunningham (2007) and others.

Some authors extend the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model (henceforth the MP model) to analyze labor market policies in developing economies, such as Zenou (2008) and Albrecht et al. (2009). In comparison to the MP model, an advantage of the BM model is that it provides a microfoundation for the idea that firms may have market power in the employment of workers. When informal sector workers may choose to stay in the informal sector (Radchenko 2014), monopsonistic firms influence workers' sorting behaviour between formality and informality. Conversely, the "outside option" of informal work places limits on firms' ability to exercise market power in labor markets.

The constructed model guides in understanding the debate regarding the impact of minimum wages on labour market outcomes in developing nations. For instance, the empirical literature generally agrees that minimum wage policies increase wages while decreasing or having little effect on formal sector employment.[8] Our model suggests a reason for this inconsistency: the minimum wage may increase labor supply by bringing in workers from the informal sector while decreasing labor demand as some low-productivity firms may no longer find it worthwhile to hire the lowest-skill workers – and the dominant effect may depend on factors such as the level of the minimum wage, the distribution of earning in the informal sector, and so on.

Finally, we contribute to the existing empirical literature by providing a comprehensive view of the impact of minimum wages on the labor market, including the effect on employment, wages for different groups of workers, non-compliance, and on monopsony indices. In particular, the empirical literature that studies the effect of minimum wages on economic rents for employers is

[8]See Gindling and Terrell (2007) for Costa Rica; Alaniz et al. (2011) for the case of Nicaragua; Lemos (2007) for Brazil; Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) for South Africa. For Indonesia see Rama, 2001; Del Carpio et al., 2015; Harrison and Scorse, 2010; Alatas and Cameron, 2008; Comola and de Mello, 2011; Magruder, 2013.

sparse, and our results suggest that further research in this direction may be worthwhile.

Section 2 introduces the Indonesian labor market, describing the informal and formal sectors, as well as outlining minimum wage regulations in Indonesia. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical analysis of the effect of minimum wages in the Indonesian labor market. In Section 4, we construct an equilibrium search model that contains features of formal and informal labor markets documented in Section 2, and delivers the findings reported in Section 3. Section 5 studies the aggregate implications of the minimum wage in the model economy calibrated to match key statistics of the Indonesian labor market. Section 6 concludes.

2. Facts about Indonesian Labor Markets

2.1. Data and definitions

We use two data sets for the analysis of the Indonesian labor market during 2000 - 2014. The first data set consists of three separate surveys conducted by the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) in 2000, 2007, and 2014 (Wave 3, Wave 4, and Wave 5). The IFLS covers 83 percent of the total population living in 13 out of the 27 provinces, primarily those with a larger population. IFLS contains rich individual-level information, which allows us to construct individual-level panel data on labor market outcomes as well as including additional control variables, detailed in Appendix A. Our sample is the working population aged 15 to 64 during the period 2000-2014. We further restrict our sample to working individuals whose earnings and household assets are between the 1st and 99th percentile of real income and real value of household assets for each year. This leaves us with 58,717 observations.

The informal sector refers to economic activity not registered with the government, not subject to taxation nor other regulations, and that does not contribute to official economic statistics. As the IFLS data do not include identifiers for the legal classification of labor, we instead depend on the official definition from Indonesia's National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik,

BPS henceforth) and the previous literature to define the informal sector, using a combination of information regarding employment type (e.g. self-employment) and sectoral information. See Appendix A for details.

We complement the IFLS data with the Indonesian manufacturing survey (IS henceforth). IS data is an annual census of all manufacturing plants in Indonesia with at least 20 employees collected by BPS. IS covers the universe of formal manufacturing sector employment from 2000 to 2009, and contains detailed information allowing us to construct indicators of firm labor market power. Our variable construction is detailed in Appendix A.

2.2. Heterogeneity in the informal sector labor market

Table 1 provides information on individuals who work in the formal and informal sectors.[9] The majority of workers (60 percent) are involved in informal sector employment, and are typically employed in businesses with fewer than five employees. Their educational attainment is lower than that of formal sector employees, implying that informal sector workers are generally less productive than formal sector wage earners. However, the informal and formal sectors are not segmented, as some individuals are observed to change their employment status over time.

Figure 1 displays the ratio of formal versus informal workers by income decile. Whereas informal sector workers constitute 78 percent of the lowest income decile, we still observe 30 percent of the individuals in the top income decile working in the informal sector. This is consistent with the view of Maloney (1999, 2004) whereby some workers rationally opt into the informal labor market due to better prospects there, in contrast to the view of Harris and Todaro (1970) and Fields (2005) who regard informal sector as involuntary. At the same time, this finding does not rule out the possibility that there might be substantial frictions that either

[9]Note that we do not include the unemployed people in our study, despite the fact that unemployment is an important outcome of minimum wage legislation. Our decision to exclude unemployment from our research is mostly based on the fact that IFLS data are deficient in unemployment-related information. The survey question "What was your primary activity during the past week?" is the most pertinent one for calculating unemployment. Only 0.9% of those who are working-age say that seeking for a job is their main activity. Since an accurate unemployment rate is often discovered in the monthly labour force survey, this information cannot be used as a substitute. The interval between IFLS data surveys is seven years.

discourage workers from formality or trap them in informality, as in De Soto (1989) or La Porta and Shleifer (2014).

2.3. Labor market imperfections in the formal sector

To study the presence of labor market frictions, we use information from IFLS rounds 4 and 5 regarding respondents' methods of job search. According to Table A.1, 48-49 percent of all respondents obtained employment through friends or relatives, and 48-50 percent of formal sector employees obtained employment through friends or relatives. In contrast, just 10% of employees obtained positions through job fairs. The table thus shows that job seekers rely on personal contacts rather than a decentralized market for their job search.

Another form of labor market imperfection that has received much attention in the literature is labor market monopsony that features worker underpayment – see Bhaskar et al (2002) and Manning (2003). To explore this possibility, we use IS data and construct several indices of monopsony. The first index is the standard measure of Pigou's E, which is the normalized gap between the value of a worker's productivity and the wage: $E = \frac{pF'(L)-w(L)}{w(L)}$, where $pF'(L)$ is firm's marginal revenue of labor product and $w(L)$ is wage. With no imperfections in the labor market, profit-maximizing employers should hire workers until the marginal product of labor equals the payment. Thus, a higher value of Pigou's E suggests that labor market distortions are more severe.

Hershbein et al (2022) argue that, when companies mark up their output, markups cause the wage payment to diverge from the worker's marginal product. In this case, Pigou's E might capture product market power rather than labor market power. To circumvent this problem, we also use an index proposed by Hershbein et al.(2022) which distinguishes between a company's factor market power on the labor market (called markdown) and its market power on the goods market (called markup). The main intuition of the method is that as long as there is one input for which firms have no monopsony power, one can construct an index that distinguish between

an output markup and an input markdown by comparing the ratios of the value of marginal product and the input price across inputs. See Appendix B for details.

We follow this approach to construct two different monopsony indexes called the CRS markdown and the CD markdown (Brooks et al. 2021). The disadvantage of using an index based on Hershbein et al. (2022) and Brooks et al. (2021) is that they assume a specific functional form for the production function and that firms have at least one input for which they do not have monopsony power. As an index based on Pigou's E measure has fewer assumptions, we employ all these indices to examine labor market monopoly and complement each other. In Appendix B, we detail the construction of different monopsony indices.

Table 2 summarises the variables included in our regression analysis with IS data. Almost every firm employs laborers for production-related tasks, while around 11 percent of firms do not use employees for non-production-related tasks. The number of firms reporting wage payments for non-production workers is even less than that of firms reporting non-production worker hiring. We cannot distinguish whether this discrepancy came from non-payment hiring or simple omission. Thus, when estimating monopsony indices, we do not impute values for omitted values in wage payment for non-production employees; instead, we use the available sample to estimate monopsony indices separately for production and non-production workers. We observe significant outliers among our estimates of monopsony indices, even after winsorizing the 3 percent on both sides. Thus, we reduce the impact of potential outliers by using natural logarithms of the indices. A significant disparity between labor's elasticity and wages, which varies across plants, is indicative of variable degrees of wage-setting power across plants.

2.4 Minimum wage variation in Indonesia

The Minimum wage law in Indonesia dates back to the 1970s. Prior to the late 1990s the minimum wage moved in lock-step across Indonesian provinces – see Figure 2A. The Asian crisis of 1997 significantly reduced the real minimum wage. More importantly, for our purposes, it

foreshadowed a process of political decentralization including the Decentralization laws of 1999, which granted individual provincial governments the authority to independently set minimum wages. Since then, the level of the minimum wage has been updated annually at the provincial level based on provincial tripartite wage councils - including representatives of the Ministry of Manpower, local employers, and unions. The autonomy of each provincial government in minimum wage setting is reflected in the increasing dispersion of real minimum wage across different provinces since 1999, see Figure 2A. Furthermore, certain provinces establish minimum wage commissions at a lower administrative level, involving a cluster of districts (kabupatens) or cities (kotas) or even individual districts or cities. The maps in Figures 2B-2D demonstrate that there was also substantial within-province variation in the minimum wage each year (Kim and Williams 2021).

The process of setting minimum wages is mostly based on negotiation and is weakly linked to technical assessments of the cost of living increases. Although there exists a price index for calculating the cost of living for workers for use as an input into minimum wage determination (Kebutuhan Hidup Minimal, KHM), the influence of the KHM on minimum wages is not always a determining factor. In particular, over the years between 2006 and 2012, the minimum wage grew by 7.6 percent per year on average, whereas in 2013 minumum wage increases were significantly higher - for example, there was a 43.7 percent increase in Jakarta and 49.7 percent in East Kalimantan in 2013.

It is a stylized fact that the minimum wage in developing countries is far closer to the median salary than in developed nations (ILO 2020), and Indonesian data also demonstrates this feature. Table A.2 in Appendix A records the ratio of the minimum wage to the median of full-time wage, part-time wage, and profit by province and year. The table indicates that the minimum wage ranges from 80 percent to 85 percent of the wages of full-time workers across the years, which indicates that the minimum wage has been used as a wage-setting mechanism rather than a safety net to protect vulnerable workers (World Bank 2010). Figure 3A illustrates this point

from another angle. The graph is the kernel density for the wage income distribution and the profit income distribution, respectively, where the distributions are normalized by the minimum wage. It is striking to observe that the normalized wage density curve is relatively stable across the years, even though there has been a rapid increase in the real minimum wage. The stability of the normalized kernel density shows that the wage distribution has been moving alongside the minimum wage.

Another significant feature regarding the minimum wage is widespread non-compliance. The Manpower Law requires all employers to pay minimum wage to full-time employees. If employers fail to pay minimum wage, the Manpower Law stipulates that employers face imprisonment between 1 and 4 years and a fine between Rp 10,000,000 and 400,000,000. Despite the high penalties, we observe from IFLS data (Fig. 3A) that the ratio of full-time formal sector workers who earn a sub-minimum wage is about 43 - 47 percent. Figure 3B also illustrates the seriousness of non-compliance from IS data. The graph shows the distribution of the mean wage for manufacturing firms, and we observe 40 percent of manufacturing firms' average wage payment is below the minimum wage. Table A.3 in Appendix A illustrates the non-compliance rate with minimum wage regulations by (i) firm size and (ii) worker education level using a sample of full-time formal sector workers. Consistent with the literature, large firms tend to comply more with minimum wage regulations. Likewise, people with high education are more likely to receive more than the minimum wage.

Given the severity of de-jure penalties, one might question the causes of the prevalence of non-compliance. Santoso and Hassan (2013) discuss extensively the implementation of the minimum wage law in Indonesia. De facto, they document that criminal penalties are almost never enforced. Instead, when such violations are detected, the remedy in practice is to compensate workers for their underpayment. The reason is that criminal penalties could negatively impact the operation of the business, which itself is a negative outcome from an economic and policy perspective. (Basu et al. 2010) Our theoretical framework will model enforcement in this manner: firms

found in violation of minimum wage laws are obliged to provide the minimum wage to their workers.

To sum up, we uncover the following stylized facts about the Indonesian labor market: (i) a sizable informal economy with significant heterogeneity in income among informal sector workers, (ii) employer monopsony power, (iii) a minimum wage close to the median wage, and (iv) imperfect compliance with minimum wage regulations.

3. Consequences of the Minimum Wage

Given the evidence of employer market power, noncompliance with the minimum wage law, and the extent of informality documented in Section 2, we pose the following questions in this section. How does the minimum wage affect (i) labor supply in the formal sector, (ii) labor demand in the formal sector, (iii) noncompliance, (iv) wage distribution, and (v) monopsonistic rents? This section is devoted to investigating these questions empirically. We first introduce our estimation strategy and then discuss the regression results.

3.1. Difference-in-Spatial Difference

Indonesia displays substantial variation in minimum wages across time and space. Due to the fact that the minimum wage determination process takes local economic conditions into account to some extent, this variation cannot be considered exogenous, which poses a challenge for causal inference using a canonical two-way fixed effect panel data approach (fixed effect for each period and a fixed effect for each district), which assumes parallel trends across provinces. To account for potentially heterogeneous trends, we follow Dube et al.(2010), Allegretto et al. (2017), and Magruder (2013) that exploit minimum wage variation among contiguous cross-border districts in adjacent provinces to construct the proper control group. That is, the method assumes that contiguous cross-border districts share economic similarities due to geographic proximity and economic trade, so that the minimum wage level does not reflect the economic conditions of

these cross-border districts if the minimum wage is set to account for economic conditions at the *province* level. Thus, any impact that variation in the minimum wage in these contiguous districts might have on labor market outcomes has a causal interpretation.

This regression discontinuity type approach (Spatial Difference, SD henceforth) also has limitations. In particular, if provincial boundaries coinicide with institutional differences other than minimum wages that influence labor market outcomes, the SD estimator attributes all changes in labor market outcomes across districts to minimum wage variation. To handle this issue, Magruder (2013) introduces the Difference-in-Spatial Difference (DSD) approach, which adds district dummies to the SD specification to relax the SD assumptions. By controlling non-parametrically for differences among borderline districts which persist over the length of the panel, the DSD approach can isolate the effect of minimum wages and allow for causal inference.

Magruder (2013) applies this strategy to the set of contiguous districts in Indonesia's bordering provinces, using districts (Kabupaten) as the unit of observation. Our identification strategy extends this approach by using *individual-level data*. Using aggregated data in regression analysis may cause misleading results as it assumes the hypothesized relationship between the economic variables is homogeneous across all individuals in the district. Instead, we employ individual-level data to allow for individual-specific relationships among control variables. We use the whole sample of individuals who live nearby the contiguous districts in the bordering provinces for DSD estimation.

A first-order analysis to motivate our primary identification strategy would see the patterns in the relationship between minimum wages and labor market outcomes when comparing nearby districts with different minimum wages. Let y^*_{ist} denote the difference between an outcome for individual i in district s in year t and the average outcome among all other individuals living in a district that is located within ϵ distance units of district s in year t.[10] Likewise, define MW^*_{st}

[10] Thus $y^*_{ist} = y_{ist} - \frac{1}{n_{st}(\epsilon)} \sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} y_{i's't'}$.

as the spatially-differenced minimum wage.[11] Figure 4 plots the spatial difference in employment status as a function of the spatially-differenced minimum wage, where a positive distance indicates that the district is located at the side of the border with the higher minimum wage. We can observe that in the districts with higher minimum wage compared to nearby districts, there is a higher ratio of formal sector or full-time formal sector workers. Also, we observe the opposite relationship for self-employed and family business: the regions with relatively lower minimum wage compared to the nearby area have a higher ratio of workers whose employment status is self-employed or family-business.

This borderline analysis suggests that the minimum wage drives the positive link between minimum wages and formal sector employment if we assume that local authorities decided minimum wage level in consideration of the overall province-level economy. However, as it is also possible that persistent district characteristics may affect the level of minimum wages, we need a further regression analysis that controls for this possibility. Our main identification strategy, DSD, is written in equation (1):

$$(1)\ y_{ist} = \beta MW_{st} + \eta GDP_{st} + \gamma X_{ist} + \alpha_s + \delta_{st} + u_{ist}$$

where i indicates an individual or a plant, s is the district of the respondent, and t represents time. MW_{st} is the log of the minimum wage that varies by time and province/districts. GDP_{st} denotes province-specific log of gross domestic product, and X_{ist} represents individual controls. With the IFLS data, X_{ist} contains log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) labor force participation status[12], age and age squared, education level and education squared. With the IS data, X_{ist} represents firm-specific controls such as percentage of government ownership and foreigner ownership respectively, log values of used material, and export status. δ_{st} controls for district-time specific heterogeneity, and α_s represents the district fixed effect that controls nonparametrically for differences between

[11] Thus $MW^*_{st} = MW_{st} - \frac{1}{n_{st}(\epsilon)} \sum_{s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} MW_{i's't'}$

[12] The labor force participation status is defined according to whether the respondent spent the majority of their time working or seeking employment.

nearby districts, which persists throughout the investigation period. Under the assumption of a shared economic environment nearby the contiguous districts within radius ϵ, the DSD method spatially differences out, δ_{st}, the time-varying local market characteristics, which is the main concern for endogeneity. As every district-year has a different radius that shares a similar labor market environment, it is not possible to measure each different radius to spatially difference out δ_{st} for each pair of borderline districts. Thus, we follow Magruder (2013) in assuming that within randomly chosen radius, ϵ, unobserved labor market circumstances or economic shocks will be shared for all the borderline districts (that is, $\delta_{st} - \delta_{s't} = 0$ if $d(s, s') < \epsilon$ where $d(s, s')$ is a measure of geographic distance). As this assumption is rather strong, we choose several different radii for robustness. Consequently, identification of β is based on minimum wage variation between neighboring districts on the border between two different provinces/districts, conditional on the individual-level characteristics and province-specific log of gross domestic product. Then the estimation of the model is based on the following differenced regression equation:

$$y^*_{ist} = \beta MW^*_{st} + \eta GDP^*_{st} + \gamma X^*_{ist} + \alpha^*_s + \delta^*_{st} + u^*_{ist}$$

or equivalently:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{ist} - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} y_{i's't} \quad &= \beta \left(MW_{st} - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} MW_{i's't} \right) \\ &+ \gamma' \left(X_{ist} - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} X_{i's't} \right) \\ &+ \left(\alpha_s - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} \alpha_s \right) \\ &+ \left(\delta_{st} - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} \delta_{s't} \right) \\ &+ \left(u_{ist} - \tfrac{1}{n_{ist}(\epsilon)} \textstyle\sum_{i',s':d(s,s')<\epsilon} u_{i's't} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where $n_{ist}(\epsilon)$ denotes the number of individuals in districts within a distance ϵ of district s in year t. If ϵ is chosen so that the local time trends, δ_{st}, are the same for districts within the radius ϵ, then the fifth term on the right-hand side is negligible and a valid estimator is obtained by estimating a regression in spatial differences. This approach weakens assumptions of regression discontinuity or the assumptions in difference-in-difference estimation in that (1) district fixed effect, α_s, controls for innate differences among nearby districts and therefore addresses issues

with spatial discontinuity in the regression discontinuity approach and (2) it loosens the assumption of parallel trends in the difference-in-difference estimation approach (Magruder, 2013). For computing standard errors, we follow the lead of Conley (1999) and Magruder (2013) by clustering at the policy group (province/minimum wage regime) level and allowing for spatial autocorrelation.

3.2. Two-Way Fixed Effect Approach

Despite the appeal of the DSD approach, we still want to consider potential shortcomings of the method. Neumark et al. (2014) and Neumark and Wascher (2017) argue that the borderline approach discards too many observations that could potentially provide valid identifying variation. A potential alternative approach is the traditional two-way fixed effects approach (TWFE henceforth) with the inclusion of regional time trends or regional macro variables. If districts or provinces with greater employment growth are more likely to raise their minimum wages, then the inclusion of regional time-trends can effectively account for this confounding source of variation. Though most studies of the minimum wage followed this strategy, Meer and West (2016) demonstrate that if the minimum wage has dynamic impacts on the evolution of outcome variables, the estimation technique that includes regional-specific time trends will likely attenuate estimates of the treatment effect. Taking this into consideration, we proceed to use the traditional two-way fixed effect approach with and without trends, alongside DSD. Including province-specific log of GDP further attenuates concerns about omitted variable bias. The following equation is our two-way fixed effect regression model:

$$(2)\ y_{ist} = \beta MW_{st} + \gamma X_{ist} + \eta GDP_{st} + \theta_j + \delta_t + (\eta_s * t) + u_{ist}$$

where $j = i$ (individual) or s (district), and $\eta_s * t$ are district-specific linear time trends. With IFLS data, we take advantage of individual-level panel data by controlling the individual fixed effect, θ_i. With IS data, we only offer results with a district fixed effect, θ_s, due to a lack of

information on plant ID for 2002 and 2003. Whenever our sample spans across years without omitting years in between, we also report our results with the inclusion of a district time-trend. For instance, when using IFLS data, we do not control for a district-specific time trend because we only have three rounds of data with a seven-year gap between surveys: we cannot restrict the identifying information based on the deviation of three data points from district-specific linear time trends. When we use the IS data, we include district-specific time trends as the interval between surveys is only one year. Then the identifying assumption is that, after controlling for individual characteristics and the provincial macroeconomy, the outcome of interest would have followed a similar trend across districts, if not for the differential changes in the minimum wage level.

3.3. Non-compliance with the minimum wage

To study the effect of minimum wage on firms' compliance behaviour, we exploit the extraordinary increase in minimum wages observed in 2013. As mentioned in Section 2, successful labor union negotiations caused a surge of the minimum wage in 2013. The World Bank (2014) described this unusual surge as an unexpected shock to most firms, and there is a steep increase in the minimum wage-median wage ratio in 2014. Several empirical studies find the importance of firm size in determining minimum wage compliance, as large businesses are subject to more stringent government monitoring and fines and hence are more likely to adhere to minimum wage regulation(Ham 2018). These previous studies motivate us to compare the non-compliance behaviour of firms based on their size: we use workers in medium-sized firms (with between 5 and 199 employees) as a treatment group and workers in large firms (with more than 200 employees) as a control group to compare the non-compliance rate in response to the extraordinary minimum wage increase in 2013.

Panel A of Figure 5 illustrates the time trend of the relative ratio of the minimum wage over the median wage. Panels B and C show compliance with the minimum wage regulation by firm

size across three periods. When we look at Panel C, we observe that non-compliance ratio for firms in the medium-sized firms (5-199 employees) and large-sized firms decrease slightly between 2000 and 2007, though it decreases faster for large firms (>200 employees). Between 2007 and 2014, however, we can observe that the non-compliance ratio for medium firms increases, whereas for large firms it does not change. It seems that minimum wage hike especially increases the non-compliance ratio for medium-sized firms. We further test this hypothesis with the following regression specification:

$$(3)\ BMW_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta D_{ijt} + \gamma X_{ijt} + \lambda_i + \delta_t + u_{ijt}$$

Here j is the firm-size category, and BMW_{ijt} is a binary indicator that identifies a worker i in the firm-size category j at time t paid below the minimum wage. D_{ijt} is the interaction term between the treatment group indicator and the year 2014 indicator. We regard the 2013 event as an exogenous policy shock to firms. The treatment and control groups were constructed using a subsample of full-time formal sector wage earners who remained at the same firm for more than two consecutive rounds. The control group consists of full-time workers who remained in firms with more than 200 employees. The treatment group consists of full-time workers who remained in firms with 5-199 employees. This regression tests how firms whose expected fine payment is small compared to the control group respond to the unanticipated minimum wage hike. The method assumes that in the absence of the unexpected minimum wage change in 2013, the compliance ratio in medium-sized firms would follow a similar trend to that of large-sized firms.

The coefficient on the interaction term, β, captures the average difference in non-compliance to the minimum wage law across the treatment and control groups before and after 2013. We also estimate an expanded version of this equation, where the treatment identifier interacts with dummy variables for each year. This regression specification tests the parallel trend assumption of difference-in-difference, and thus examines the validity of a difference-in-difference strategy to

test for non-compliance with the minimum wage law.

Despite the fact that our estimation with individual-level panel data avoids the systematic misreporting problem encountered with firm-level data analysis, the estimation results from this analysis should be interpreted with caution due to a number of econometric issues (Ham, 2018). First, the firm's willingness to comply with the minimum wage regulation depends on the intensity of government monitoring; however, no data are available to quantify this. Second, it is difficult to distinguish between the control and treatment groups. Despite the fact that our sample consists of individuals who remained at the same firm size for both survey rounds, there is a seven-year gap between surveys. We do not note the job searching behaviour of individuals between these seven years. Despite this limitation of the analysis, this is what can be done with the available data, and the estimation result still provides insight into the firms' compliance with the minimum wage increase. In the next session, we report estimates of the minimum wage impact on employment, wages, monopsony indices, and non-compliance.

3.4. Empirical Results on Labor Market Outcomes

Table 3 presents the regression results for various categories of employment in response to real minimum wages using SD, DSD, TWFE methods. To demonstrate the validity of the findings, the table presents SD and DSD estimates with varying bandwidths used to define contiguous districts. Binary indicators for each category of employment are constructed and used as dependent variables. Individuals who work in the government or the private sector fall under the formal sector group. Respondents who work in the formal sector more than 40 hours per week are classified as full-time formal. Respondents who work in the formal sector for fewer than 40 hours are classified as part-time formal. The Self-Employed group comprises respondents who are either self-employed or self-employed with family members. To define Family Business, we add unpaid family workers to the preceding group. The regression results report the probability of being in each employment category compared to being in another category of employment.

The DSD regression results for employment status show that a rise in the minimum wage is not statistically significantly related to employment status. If we increase our control sample to increase statistical power at the expense of allowing potential endogeneity, the DSD estimator starts to show statistically significant results: at the bandwidth of 60 miles, we find a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is positively related with an increase in formal sector employment of 1.1 percent and a decrease in family businesses of 1.2 percent. These results are consistent with informal sector workers' sorting into the formal sector in response to minimum wage increases. Though DSD regression results does not show robust result across different choice of bandwidth, it still provides weak evidence that minimum wages lead some workers to sort into the full-time formal labor market, increasing labor supply. On the other hand, the DSD estimator suggests that workers sort *out* of part-time formal status when minimum wages increase, with a statistically significant effect at the bandwidth of 40 miles. If we consider part-time workers as marginal, low-productivity formal-sector workers, our estimates indicate that formal sector marginal workers are more likely to lose their jobs due to the minimum wage increase. This suggests that some firms may no longer find it profitable to hire low-productivity workers with a higher minimum wage.

Our results with SD and TWFE regressions show statistically significant results. The results with the SD specification are more pronounced in magnitude compared to the DSD estimates, which can be attributed to the absence of district dummy variables; once these variables have been controlled for, the coefficients on minimum wage lose its magnitude and statistical significance. TWFE estimates are somewhat similar to those of DSD, and we find a statistically significant and positive effect on formal sector employment and a negative impact on family businesses. The only noticeable difference compared to the SD and DSD estimators is on Part-Time formal sector workers: TWFE results show a positive relation between minimum wages and part-time work, whereas the SD and DSD results show negative coefficients. Overall, our regression results provide weak evidence that minimum wages lead workers to sort into the formal labor market,

although the impact on marginal workers is less clear and may be negative. This implies that the overall impact of minimum wages on the size of the formal labor market is ambiguous.

Plant-level data further support the results with the IFLS sample. In Table 4, we present our estimation results for the number of plant-level employees. We present three sets of results by regressing on total workers, production workers, and non-production workers with SD, DSD, and TWFE respectively. Except SD method, we do not find statistically significant association between minimum wage and number of workers, with the exception of the 25-mile bandwidth for DSD estimation. Still, the signs are positive, although statistically significant mainly for the SD specification.

These findings are consistent with Magruder (2013) and Hohberg and Lay (2015), who also used IFLS data, but are not consistent with Harrison and Score (2010) or Del Carpio et al. (2015), who used IS data. Harrison and Score (2010) and Del Carpio et al. (2015) used IS data to discover a statistically significant negative impact of the minimum wage. The results with IS data in this paper differ from their results due to several reasons. First, our paper uses different sample periods compared to the other two works. Harrison and Score used date from period 1988 - 1996 when the central government centralized the determination of each province's minimum wage. In contrast, our sample is drawn from periods when each provincial government determined its minimum wage level based on the local economy. The analysis of Del Carpio et al. (2015) uses the same years between 1993 and 2006. During the periods, the Indonesian economy experienced a financial crisis, the demise of Suharto, and the decentralization of the bureaucratic regime. It is well known in the literature that during an economic recession, labor protection regulations such as minimum wages amplify the negative employment effect as market wages are often lower than the minimum wage. In contrast to their analysis, we restrict our samples to the periods when the economy stays on a steady growth phase, as our paper aims to understand the impact of the minimum wage on steady-state or long-run employment: the Indonesian economy, from 2000 to 2014, did not experience a significant downturn but shows a steady increase in gross

domestic product per capita. Second, our paper uses district-level minimum wages. While there were only five provinces that exhibited within-province variation in minimum wages in 2000, by 2014, at least 14 out of Indonesia's 34 provinces had within-province variation in the minimum wage. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to use all the district-level minimum wage variation across the time span between 2000 and 2014. Third, our DSD estimator lessens the common trend assumption of the fixed effect approach used by both papers.

Tables 5 and 6 report the effect of the minimum wage on the average wage using IFLS and IS sample respectively. We find a statistically significant and positive wage effect for both individuals and plants. From the IFLS sample, the DSD estimator suggests that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with 8-10.5 percent wage increase for formal sector workers.[13] The SD estimator finds larger coefficient compared to the DSD estimator, as was the case for employment regression results. The TWFE estimator shows smaller effects compared to the DSD method.

Apart from the overall impact, it is informative to study the impact of minimum wage policies on distinct groups of employees, namely those who earn less than the minimum wage initially and those who earn more than the minimum wage initially. Basu et al. (2010) predict that if there is incomplete monitoring for the minimum wage law and the fine increases in proportion to the amount of gap between minimum wage and equilibrium sub-minimum wage, initially non-complying firms will further reduce wages in response to minimum wage. However, empirical work often finds increases in sub-minimum wages in response to a hike in the legal minimum wage (Cunningham, 2007). Our regression results support the results of Cunningham (2007). Notably, the DSD estimator finds that wage increase for the initial sub-minimum wage-paid group is greater than for the other group whose initial wage is higher than the minimum wage at the bandwidth of 35, 40, 60 miles. A similar pattern is observed with the TWFE estimator and SD estimator across all bandwidths.

[13] The reason that we observe more than 10 percent of the wage increase in response to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage with IFLS data is that the estimation also contains individuals who sort into a wage-earning job.

Regression results with IS data are also consistent with the analysis with IFLS data, except that the coefficient is much smaller now. Our DSD estimate indicates that with a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage, average wage increases by 2.9 - 4.9 percent for all workers, 2.7 - 4.8 percent among production workers, and 4.7 - 5.4 among non-production workers, respectively. Overall, we find the minimum wage raises wages across the entire distribution, but primarily at the lower end.

Table 7 presents regression results on the minimum wage's relationship to market distortion indices. As explained in Section 2, if the gap between the marginal revenue of labor and wage comes from the monopsonistic behavior of employers, minimum wage regulations could work as a market correcting tool and reduce market distortions. We study this hypothesis by studying the relationship between minimum wage and various market imperfection indices. Market imperfection indices, as measured by Pigou's E, CRS/CD Markdown, and CRS/CD Markup are regressed on the minimum wage using SD, DSD, and TWFE, respectively.

Our most persuasive regression results are (i) DSD and (ii) TWFE with district-specific time trend if its coefficients do not significantly differ from TWFE without district-specific time trends. As explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the SD estimator may be prone to omitted variable bias, and the TWFE without controlling for district-specific time trend may be vulnerable to differing pre-trends. However, if the inclusion of time trend on TWFE significantly differs from TWFE without time trend, we should be suspicious of the dynamic effect of the minimum wage on outcome variables (Meer and West, 2016). From this perspective, our findings indicate that an increase in the minimum wage reduces firms' monopsony behaviour, particularly for non-production workers, although not all of our estimation results reveal a statistically significant effect across various estimation methods and bandwidth selections.

Especially, estimation results on CRS Markdown indices are most consistent across methods and bandwidth: DSD estimates demonstrate statistically significant and negative minimum wage effects of 2.7% to 3.5% for a 10% increase in the minimum wage for non-production workers at

25, 30, and 40 miles of bandwidth. With TWFE estimation, we find a decrease of 1.3% in the CRS Markdown for a 10% minimum wage change.

When CD markdowns are the dependent variable, the DSD estimator reveals statistically significant adverse effects of the minimum wage only at a bandwidth of 25 miles (3% decrease per 10% minimum wage increase). Although our DSD regression results on markdown indices for non-production workers are not robust across different bandwidths, estimation results from the TWFE estimator with district-specific time trends (1.7% decrease per 10% minimum wage increase) comparable to TWFE estimation without the trends (2% decrease per 10% minimum wage increase) imply that minimum wage has a statistically significant negative effect on markdowns. Our DSD estimates for CD Markups shows a statistically significant and positive effect (0.8-2% decrease per 10% minimum wage increase, depending on the choice of bandwidth). The results indicate that the rise in the minimum wage forces some firms to exit the market, while the surviving firms improve their output market share, as reflected in the Markup index.

Table 8 presents estimation findings for equation (3), which compares the noncompliance practises of medium-sized enterprises (treatment group) and large firms (control group) in reaction to the unexpected increase in the minimum wage in 2013. In reaction to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage, the non-compliance ratio rises from 0.7 to 0.8 percent, as shown in the table. This result is robust to the inclusion of dummy interaction terms. This finding indicates that medium-sized firms tend to break minimum wage regulation in the presence of the unexpected minimum wage shock.

Overall, our empirical results support the idea that the minimum wage has competing demand and supply effects in the labor market, and that it erodes monopsony exploitation. Historical increases in minimum wages during 2000-2014 in Indonesia raise the overall wage distribution across different segments of the labor market, but while some workers enter formality some low productivity firms seem to drop out. We also find the minimum wage reduces the economic rents of remaining firms. Lastly, the growth in non-compliant wage payments in response to the 2013

minimum wage increase among small and medium-sized firms suggests that smaller businesses have a stronger economic incentive for non-compliance. These estimation results are robust when we only only sample of individuals without migration history, as reported in Appendix C.

4. Model Economy

We now develop a model economy that incorporates the key features of the labor market underlined in Section 2. To capture the monopsonistic behavior of firms, our model extends the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework by allowing for heterogeneity in firm productivity, in worker productivity, and also in the workers' outside option: informal sector income. The BM model provides a theoretical foundation for monopsony power even when there is no dominant player in the labor market, using frictions. We combine this model with Basu et al.(2010) by punishing firms that do not comply with the minimum wage, in case they are detected. Finally, we follow Engbom and Moser (2018) by introducing a labor market segmented by formal labor-market skill level. The constructed model features stylized labor market characteristics found in developing countries, such as the existence of both formal and informal markets, heterogeneity in earnings potential in both markets, labor market frictions rationing formal jobs, the possibility that some agents choose to remain in the informal sector, the fact that firms do not pay the marginal product of labor, and imperfect compliance with minimum wage laws.

4.1. Environment

We study a stationary economy in continuous time. The measure of workers in the labor market z is indicated by m_z, whereas the measure of employers is normalized to 1. Firms may choose to offer a wage ω to a worker. If ω is below the minimum wage, this is detected with probability κ, in which case the firm must pay the minimum wage ω_{min} that period. As a result, it will be convenient to define the *expected* earned wage, $\widetilde{\omega} = \omega + \kappa max\{0, \omega_{min} - \omega\}$. It is the *expected* wage that determines a worker's behavior regarding a particular job offer. Similarly,

it is the expected wage that determines firms' expected profits. If we define n_z as the number of workers hired by the firm with skill z, we see that expected punishment $\kappa(\omega_{min} - \omega)n_z(\widetilde{\omega})$, increases with the enforcement intensity, κ, the gap between the minimum wage and the offered wage, $\omega_{min} - \omega$, and the employment level at labor market z, n_z. This characteristic of the model is consistent with the higher minimum wage compliance of large firms documented in section 3: a higher penalty in the event of monitoring motivates large firms to comply with the minimum wage.

4.2. Workers

Workers are risk-neutral. They may be (i) current employees in the formal sector, or (ii) workers in the informal sector.[14] Workers differ in their formal ability level, z, and their informal earnings potential x. Worker's ability z has distribution $T(\cdot)$ over support $[\underline{z}, \overline{z}]$, and $H_z(x)$ denotes the proportion of workers with ability z whose potential earnings in the informal sector is no greater than x.

Informal earnings potential x is the worker's outside option. This may differ from the worker's reservation wage, $R_z(x)$. Define $D_z(R_z(x))$ as the proportion of workers with ability z whose reservation wage is no greater than $R_z(x)$. We assume that earning in the informal sector x is positively related to her ability as an employee; if $z_1 < z_2$, then $H_{z_1}(x) \preceq_{FOSD} H_{z_2}(x)$. In Appendix D.1. we show that cumulative distribution of informal sector earning is identical to the cumulative distribution of reservation wage ($H_z(x) = D_z(R_z(x))$ so that, if $z_1 < z_2$, then $D_{z_1}(R_{z_1}(x)) \preceq_{FOSD} D_{z_2}(R_{z_2}(x))$).

The labor market is segmented by z in that workers with ability z are allowed to search wage earning jobs only in the corresponding labor market (also labeled z). Search is a random process as workers do not direct their search towards specific firms. Workers maximize their lifetime

[14] Unlike the original BM paper, we do not make the assumption for the unemployed workers in our model. In the IFLS sample, people who can be treated as unemployed are those whose primary activities during the past week involved searching for a job. In our sample, these people are less than 1 percent among the respondents, whereas more than half are in the informal sector.

income discounted at rate ρ.

Individuals receive job offers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate λ_z^s where $s = i, e$. Let λ_z^i denote the arrival rate for the informal sector laborer, and λ_z^e be the arrival rate for those currently working in the formal sector. We assume that currently hired employees in the labor market z have the same instantaneous job arrival rate (λ_z^e).[15] However, given that firms with different productivity may offer different wages, workers face a non-degenerate wage distribution - including wage offers that may be above, equal to or below the minimum wage.

We define the distribution of the firm's expected wage payment as $F_z(\widetilde{\omega})$.[16] Formal sector jobs will be terminated exogenously at rate δ_z, or endogenously by laborers moving ahead to better paying formal sector jobs. Let $S_z(x)$ be the value function of an agent with ability z who works in the informal sector whose outside option is x, and let $W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x)$ be the value function of that agent when working in the formal sector with an expected earned wage, $\widetilde{\omega}$. The worker receives x in case he chooses to work in the informal sector. Then the following Bellman equations can be formulated.

$$(4)\ \rho S_z(x) = x + \lambda_z^i \int_{\underline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z}^{\overline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z} max\{W_z(y,x) - S_z(x), 0\} dF_z(y)$$

$$(5)\ \rho W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x) = \widetilde{\omega} + \lambda_z^e \int_{\widetilde{\omega}}^{\overline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z} (W_z(y,x) - W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x)) dF_z(y) + \delta_z [S_z(x) - W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x)]$$

where $\overline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z$ and $\underline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z$ denote highest and lowest wage payment in the labor market z accordingly. From these equations the reservation wage can be derived as follows:

$$(6)\ R_z(x) = x + (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \int_{R_z(x)}^{\overline{\widetilde{\omega}}_z} \frac{1 - F_z(y)}{\rho + \delta_z + \lambda_z^e (1 - F_z(y))} dy$$

As $W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x)$ is increasing in $\widetilde{\omega}$ whereas $S_z(x)$ is independent of it, there is a unique reservation

[15] An alternative would be to assume that the arrival rates are endogenous and based on firm effort. Our model shows this is not required for identifying contrasting labor demand and supply effects of the minimum wage. In addition, our calibration later on finds that, even without a mollifying effect of the minimum wage on job arrival rates, the aggregate impact of the minimum wage is negative, so in that sense our assumption is conservative.

[16] The wage package for legally hired workers and illegally hired ones can differ in different dimensions other than financial remuneration. For example, it is often the case that formal sector workers receive benefits such as insurance subsidies. We address this difference in benefits by defining the wage as the entire monetary compensation for the worker. The wage is after tax (if it is levied) but before social security deductions. Social security is considered part of their compensation as it entitles them to a pension and health benefits.

wage, $R_z(x)$, such that $W_z(\widetilde{\omega}, x) \gtrless S_z(x)$ as $\widetilde{\omega} \gtrless R_z(x)$. The decision rule of agents is to become a wage-earner in the formal sector if $\widetilde{\omega} > R_z(x)$, and remain self-employed if $\widetilde{\omega} < R_z(x)$.

Let us define I_z as the total ratio of informal sector workers in market z, and define $G_z(\widetilde{\omega})$ as the distribution of earnings among formal sector workers whose ability is z. Then the steady-state number of formal sector workers in market z employed by employers offering a wage in the interval $[\widetilde{\omega} - \epsilon, \widetilde{\omega}]$ is given by $(m_z - I_z)dG_z(\widetilde{\omega})$, while $dF_z(\widetilde{\omega})$ is the measure of firms offering a wage in the same interval. Appendix D.2 shows that the steady state measure $n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z)$ of workers per firm offered an expected wage $\widetilde{\omega}$ is:

$$(7)\ n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z) = \frac{(m_z - I_z)dG_z(\widetilde{\omega})}{dF_z(\widetilde{\omega})} = \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega})}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})))(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})))}$$

where $k_z^i = \lambda_z^i/\delta$, and $k_z^e = \lambda_z^e/\delta$.

4.3. Firms

There is a continuum of heterogeneous firms whose idiosyncratic productivity, p, is drawn from the distribution Γ. Let Z be the set of labor markets where firms operate. Firms join multiple labor markets, $z \in Z$, with different wage posting strategies ω, considering the level of minimum wage, the enforcement rate, κ, and the distribution of worker's reservation wage, $D_z(R_z(x))$. Firms commit to paying a wage ω for the remainder of the match. They operate a linear production technology combining n_z workers from each labor market z to produce flow output. Then, firm output is:

$$y(p, \{n_z\}_{z \in Z}) = p \int_{z \in Z} z n_z dz$$

Entrepreneurs maximize their aggregate profit by maximizing profit π_z in each labor market separately.

$$(8)\ \pi_z = max_{\widetilde{\omega} \geq \kappa\omega_{min}, \underline{R}_z} \left\{ (pz - \widetilde{\omega})\, n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z) \right\}$$

where $n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z)$ is the labor hired at wage $\widetilde{\omega}$, given F_z and D_z, and $\underline{R}_z$ is the lowest reservation wage in the labor market z. In other words, employers decide wages in each segmented

labor market to maximize (8), considering the expected wage payment distribution, $F_z(\widetilde{\omega})$, the distribution of reservation wage for the workers, $D_z(R_z(x))$, and the measure of workers available with expected wage $\widetilde{\omega}$ in labor market z, $n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z)$, which is derived in equation (7). If the lowest reservation wage $\underline{R}_z$ is less than the minimum wage ω_{min}, some employers may hire workers with a sub-minimum wage, as such a wage is still greater than worker's reservation wage. However, imperfect monitoring still works to enforce an effective expected minimum wage of at least $\kappa\omega_{min}$.

4.4. Equilibrium

The stationary search equilibrium is a set of reservation policies functions $\{R_z(x)\}_{z\in Z,x\in H}$; wage offer distributions $\{F_z(\widetilde{\omega})\}_{z\in Z}$; firm sizes $\{n_z(\widetilde{\omega})\}_{z\in Z}$; self-employment rates $\{I_z(R_z(x))\}_{z\in Z,x\in H}$ such that given ω_{min} and κ,

1. Worker optimality: Given x,z,ω, κ, and $F_z(\widetilde{\omega})$, workers set reservation policies, $R_z(x)$, that direct their employment status.

2. Entrepreneur optimality: Taking $F_z(\widetilde{\omega})$ as given and knowing $D_z(R_z(x)), k_z^i, k_z^e$, and m_z, the wage policies in each market solves the entrepreneurs' problem.

3. Labor market consistency: The self employment rates in labor market z are consistent with $I_z(\overline{R}_z|F_z) = \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\overline{R}_z} \left(\frac{\delta_z m_z}{\delta_z+\lambda_z^i[1-F_z(y)]}\right) dD_z(y)$.

4. Aggregation: The wage distribution in each segment of the labor market is determined by the above conditions.

4.5. Equilibrium characterization

Many properties of the model equilibrium are similar to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Engbom and Moser (2022). These include the following propositions.

Proposition 1: In the given labor market z, workers in the more productive firms earn higher wages than workers in the less productive firms.

Proof: See Appendix D.3.

As in Bontemps et al. (2000) there is a unique equilibrium wage associated with each productivity level p. This implies that the equilibrium distribution of wage offers is a transformation of the underlying distribution of employer productivity. Let us define $Q_z(p)$ as the proportion of workers that a firm with productivity p can attract in market z. Then, we can derive the following result.

Proposition 2: There exists an equilibrium expected wage correspondence, $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$, that maps underlying firm productivity into a wage offer.

$$(9)\ \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = z\left[p - \int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} \frac{A_z(p)/Q_z(p)}{A_z(y)/Q_z(y)} dy\right]$$

where $A_z(p)$= $(\delta_z + \lambda_z^i(1 - J_z(p)))\,(\delta_z + \lambda_z^e(1 - J_z(p)))$.

Proof: See Appendix D.3.

To understand the Proposition, note that $A_z(p)$ is positively related to the outflow of workers in market segment z who receive higher wage offers. This outflow is lower for high productivity firms, so $\frac{\partial A_z(p)}{\partial p} < 0$. As $Q_z(p)$ is the proportion of workers of type z that a firm with productivity p can attract, $\frac{A_z(p)}{Q_z(p)}$ is the proxy for the ratio of the outflow compared to the inflow. Notice also that $\frac{\partial \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)}{\partial(\underline{R}_z/z)} = \frac{A_z(p)/Q_z(p)}{A_z((\underline{R}_z/z))/Q_z((\underline{R}_z/z))} > 0$, indicating that as the least productive firms in this labour market become more productive, wage posting strategies for the all other firms in the same labor market are positively affected in equilibrium (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Note further that the equilibrium expected wage, $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$, is a convex function of the minimum reservation wage, $\underline{R}_z$ $\left(\frac{\partial \frac{\partial \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)}{\partial(\underline{R}_z/z)}}{\partial(\underline{R}_z/z)} = \frac{A_z(p)}{Q_z(p)} \frac{Q_z'(\underline{R}_z/z)A_z(\underline{R}_z/z) - Q_z(\underline{R}_z/z)A_z'(\underline{R}_z/z)}{[A_z(\underline{R}_z/z)]^2} > 0\right)$. This suggests that the increased minimum reservation wage positively affects equilibrium wage *change.*

Proposition 3: An increase in the minimum wage increases equilibrium wage distributions in any labour market, z, where it binds ($\underline{R}_z \leq \kappa\omega_{min}$).

Proof: See Appendix D.3.

This proposition parallels the intuition gained from the Proposition 2. A minimum wage increase affects the equilibrium wage distribution as it affects the level of productivity of the least productive firm operating in a labor market where the minimum wage binds. Note that the property has implications for monopsony rents: since firm productivity p is exogenous, a higher minimum wage increases equilibrium wages and thus decreases the rents $p - \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$ that accrue to any firm hiring in market z - consistent with the empirical findings in Section 3.

Proposition 4: A minimum wage hike increases employment by the firms whose productivity is greater than $\frac{\kappa_z \omega_{min}}{z}$ in the labor market z $\left(p > \frac{\kappa_z \omega_{min}}{z}\right)$, while it pushes out firms from the market whose productivity less than $\frac{\kappa_z \omega_{min}}{z}$, $\left(\frac{\kappa_z \omega_{min}}{z} > p\right)$.
Proof: See Appendix D.3.

This proposition outlines the impact of minimum wages on labor supply and demand in the formal sector. A higher minimum wage increases labor supply to all firms who continue operating in labor market z, as more workers find it worthwhile to search for formal employment. On the other hand, it also generates a decrease in labor demand by driving marginal firms and workers out of the formal labor market.

Proposition 5: A minimum wage hike increases the non-compliance ratio among the formal sector firms.
Proof: See Appendix D.3.

Proposition 3 implies that a minimum wage increase of 1 Rupiah raises wages across the distribution by less than 1 Rupiah. Proposition 5 is the logical extension of this implication: as long as it is profitable, firms will continue to hire employees with sub-minimum wages instead of firing them, and the number of non-complying firms will increase in response to a minimum wage increase.

Proposition 6: For labor market z where the minimum wage has an effect, an increase in the minimum wage boosts the remuneration of lower paid workers more than that of higher paid workers.

Proof: See Appendix D.3.

This is a logical consequence of the "ripple effect" of the minimum wage. Though the entire equilibrium wage distribution is affected by the imposition of a minimum wage, it primarily affects lower-productivity firms. This is consistent with our empirical findings that a minimum wage increase has a more significant effect on those earning less than the minimum wage than those earning the legal wage at the initial payment.

To sum up, a model economy with monopsonistic employers that extends the BM framework with several dimensions of heterogeneity and which allows for non-compliance is able to generate a number of our empirical findings, answering the questions posed at the beginning of Section 3. In particular, we find that a higher minimum wage: (i) induces some informal sector workers to enter the formal sector; (ii) may lead low productivity firms stop employing low-productivity workers; (iii) increases non-compliance with minimum wage laws; (iv) raises wages across the entire wage distribution, including among the previously non-compliant; and (v) decreases monopsonistic rents.

5. Macroeconomic Implications

Whereas our structural model has clear predictions regarding the effect of minimum wages on equilibrium wages, monopsony rents, and non-compliance, the model is ambiguous regarding the aggregate effect of minimum wage on employment: the minimum wage motivates workers to enter the formal sector, while marginal workers are rationed out. In this section, we calibrate the model economy, in order to study the aggregate impact of minimum wages.

5.1 Parameterization

To simulate the model economy, we require a discrete approximation. We use 50 discrete values of z and 50 discrete values of p. We set the grid of values so as to cover between the 99th and 1st percentiles of the distribution of each variable. We use 100 values of x rather than 50 as we need to capture small differences in reservation wages, which depend on x. We also set the grid of values for x so as to cover between the 99th and 1st percentiles of its distribution. Since the distribution of x depends on z, this also means that each z has slightly different values of x.

First, we assume that the distribution of log firm productivity p is normal with mean and s.d μ and σ respectively. We assume that the distibution of log worker productivity z is normal also, with mean and s.d of μ_z and σ_z. Finally, we assume that the distribution of log informal income x is also normal. However, it is possible that x and z might be correlated. As a result, we assume that the mean of the distribution is $\mu_x + \zeta \log z$ for some real number ζ, and that the s.d. is σ_x. This implies that the covariance of $\log x$ and $\log z$ is $\zeta\sigma_z^2$.

The parameters to be calibrated then are μ, σ, μ_z, σ_z, μ_p, σ_p, ζ, λ_z, δ_z, κ, $w_{\min}$ and ρ.

5.2 Calibration

We start by setting certain parameters directly, and set the remainder indirectly to match certain moments of the data. We use annual data so as to be consistent with the empirical work.

We assume that the annual discount rate is 5 percent, following Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011), so $\rho = 0.05$. One of the means of the log productivity indices is just a scale factor for the size of the economy, so without loss of generality we set $\mu_z = 0$. We compute the log productivity distribution across firms in the IS data, finding a mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 0.1: accordingly, we set $\mu_p = 2$ and $\sigma_p = 0.1$.

To compute the job finding rate we sort agents in the IFLS data by income decile. Then, taking the informal workers in each decile, we compute the job finding rate into the formal work force. We found that the hazard rates decrease by income from 0.29 to 0.17. Let $z_{\min}$ and $z_{\max}$

be the lowest and highest values of z in our grid respectively. Then we set λ_z to be a linear function of z, with $\lambda_{z_{\min}} = 0.29$ and $\lambda_{z_{\max}} = 0.17$.

To compute the job loss rate we sort agents in the IFLS data by income decile in the formal sector, and compute the observed hazard rates out of the formal work force. We found that the hazard rates decrease by income from 0.18 to 0.02. Let $z_{\min}$ and $z_{\max}$ be the lowest and highest values of z in our grid respectively. Then we set δ_z to be a linear function of z, with $\delta_{z_{\min}} = 0.18$ and $\delta_{z_{\max}} = 0.02$. See Table 9 for the parameter values.

This leaves μ, σ, σ_z, ζ, κ and $w_{\min}$. We calibrate these six parameters by targeting six calibration statistics. These are the share of the formal sector workforce, the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage (specifically, the median value of this statistic across provinces), the coefficient of variation of formal earnings, the coefficient of variation of informal earnings, the ratio of mean formal earnings to mean informal earnings, and the share of workers earning below the minimum wage. Table 10 displays the values of these statistics in the data, alongside the calibrated model values.[17]. The model provides a reasonable match to the statistics from the data after about 100,000 iterations.

5.3 Simulations

Having calibrated the model economy, we proceed to examine the impact of the minimum wage on the aggregate features of the model. We start with the calibrated value of the minimum wage and raise it by up to 200 percent, so as to explore a wide range of values.

First, Figure 6 compares the CDF of wages generated by the model economy for the baseline calibration and for the case where the minimum wage is increased by 200 percent. There is a noticeable shift in the wage distribution towards higher wages, as proved earlier. This implies that higher minimum wages may lead the marginal informal worker to search for formal work: in other words, the labor supply effect is quantitatively significant in the calibrated economy.

Nonetheless, we find that raising the minimum wage by 200 percent decreases the sum of total

[17] We calibrate the model economy using data for the year 2000, which is the beginning of the sample.

output[18] by about 6.2 percent. See Figure 7. Total worker income also declines by about 6.2 percent. Thus, it appears that the negative impact of minimum wage hikes on labor demand dominates the labor supply effect, so that a higher minimum wage leads some workers to fall out of the formal labor force. Since these workers would have been more productive in the formal labor market, this leads total output to decline. These workers are relatively unproductive, however, so the aggregate impact is small unless the minimum wage hike is substantial.

The impact on the structure of the labor market is considerably more significant. As shown in Figure 8, the minimum wage rise of 200 percent leads the formal sector to shrink from 44 percent to 36 percent of the labor force. Similarly, the share of workers paid less than the minimum wage rises from around 50 percent to 88 percent. This is consistent with the empirical finding that a higher minimum wage is related to lower compliance, and with the fact that, as seen above, the labor demand effect on aggregate turns out to dominate the labor supply effect.

We note that these findings are also equivalent to keeping the minimum wage fixed, but raising the enforcement parameter κ by a similar factor - or any combination of minimum wage hikes and increases in κ of equivalent joint magnitude.

The fact that the minimum wage unambiguously appears to lower the size of the formal labor force and aggregate output begs the question: is there a lower minimum wage that has a salutary effect on aggregate output in the calibrated economy? The answer turns out to be no. In Figure 9, we explore minimum wages ranging from zero up to the 200 percent wage hike explored earlier. We find that a minimum wage below the calibrated level has very little impact on aggregate output. Figure 10 shows that a minimum wage below that level has little impact on the structure of the labor market also (except that the lower minimum wage implies a lower share of underpaid workers).

It is interesting to observe that, while the aggregate impact of the minimum wage in Figures 7 and 9 is monotonic, it is also non-linear. This is due to the fact that occupational choice

[18] This includes total output generated by all firms and all output generated by informal sector workers. Thus it includes total labor income, formal and informal, and the income of the firms themselves.

decisions are based on a comparison of the agent's informal sector income opportunity x with their formal sector opportunities, which depend on z but which also depend on endogenous wage posting competition among firms. The aggregate effect thus depends on the interaction of the joint distribution of the log-linear variables x and z with monopsonistic competition among firms with productivity p drawn from an independent distribution who may also choose to exit certain labor market segments, so it is not surprising that the effect of minimum wage increases is non-linear. In reality, these features of developing economy labor markets - the fact that occupational choice decisions depend on the joint distribution of agent opportunities in different occupations, and the fact that the evidence supports the presence of monopsonistic competition among firms - suggest that minimum wages may indeed have a non-linear effect. This could be another reason behind the difficulty in the empirical literature of establishing the impact of the minimum wage on formal employment: the impact of the minimum wage depends on a complex interaction between formal labor market opportunities and outside options that are only partially correlated.

To conclude, the calibration illustrates that both the demand and supply effects are present. However, the minimum wage has a contractionary effect on the calibrated model economy, because formal sector firms no longer find it profitable to hire certain low-productivity workers. The extent of this contraction in the calibrated economy is non-linear, because it depends on an interaction between the distribution of agent options in different occupations as well as heterogeneous firms' wage posting decisions and decisions of whether or not to hire different types of workers. In spite of the richness of heterogeneity in our model economy, the calibration provides an unambiguous prediction in terms of the sign of the impact of the minimum wage (although of course this masks some redistribution, since some workers benefit from the presence of the minimum wage).

From a policy perspective, the joint distributions of the empirical counterparts of x, z and p could be different in different countries because of differences in schooling, institutions, FDI

or other factors. At the same time, our quantitative exploration indicates that the presence of monopsonistic competition is not sufficient to generate an increase in formality and aggregate welfare from a higher minimum wage. Consequently, our research suggests that decisions about the minimum wage need to take into account the marginal decisions of informal sector workers and of formal sector firms. Any redistributive goals that minimum wage laws might target would have to be weighed against potential aggregate losses resulting from reductions in labor demand, and quantifying such losses would require this kind of information.

6. Conclusion

We analyze the impact of the minimum wage on the labor market in developing economies, using Indonesia as a laboratory. We exploit historical Indonesian minimum wage data from 2000 to 2014 to understand the impact of the minimum wage on a variety of labor market outcomes using several different empirical approaches. Using the sample of workers located near the province/district border, we conduct a difference-in-spatial-difference (DSD) estimation, an approach that weakens the assumption of both regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference. When the data structure justifies the inclusion of trends, we also perform traditional two-way fixed effect (TWFE) analysis that include district-specific trends. Our regression results indicate that a rise in the minimum wage has no clear detrimental effect on employment, contrary to what a competitive labor market would imply. In addition, our empirical findings demonstrate a positive effect of the minimum wage on the average salary (for both the initially sub-minimum wage paid and the over-minimum wage paid workers) and a negative effect on the economic rents of monopsonists.

Then, we construct a search model in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), extended to capture important features of developing economy labor markets. A key feature is the imperfect enforcement of minimum wages, along with heterogeneous firm productivity, heterogeneous worker productivity and heterogeneous informal income opportunities. In the model economy, we

show that the minimum wage raises the entire wage distribution, as firms engage in wage-posting competition. The increase in the distribution of posted wages generates an incentive for some informal sector workers to find jobs in the formal sector, whereas some marginal workers in the formal sector are rationed out. While the model leaves open the possibility of either a positive or negative effect of the minimum wage on formal employment, it provides an unambiguous prediction regarding an increase in formal sector wage payments, a reduced gap between marginal labor productivity and wages, and an increase in the ratio of non-compliance with minimum wage regulations, particularly among smaller firms.

Finally, we calibrate the model economy to examine the aggregate impact of the minimum wage. The calibration validates the model prediction that a minimum wage increase increases the equilibrium wage distribution and the proportion of employees receiving subminimum wages. Concerning the employment effect, we find that the minimum wage *reduces* formal sector employment and output in the calibrated economy. These results imply that, while the presence of monopsony in labor markets may potentially allow minimum wage increases to raise formal sector employment, this is by no means a given, as it depends on local labor market conditions in both the formal and informal sectors, and the incentives of firms and workers to enter different labor markets.

Our paper suggests several extensions. First, our model economy takes the set of potential employers as given. It would be interesting to extend the model to study the occupational choice between a formal sector wage-earning job and a formal sector *entrepreneur/employer*. An increase in the minimum wage gives more incentives to individuals to earn a formal sector wage-earning job, and less incentive to become an entrepreneur in the formal sector, which could reduce labor demand. However, given that entrepreneurial productivity might be only partially correlated with productivity in terms of x, and z, this would be a non-trivial extension. Second, given that our model is able to reproduce many key features of developing economy labor markets, it would be interesting to use it to investigate the impact of other forms of labor market regulation in

the model economy. Third, it would be interesting to see whether variation in minimum wages across space leads to variation in the types of firms that might locate in different provinces. To the extent that capital is mobile, firms may be able to avoid the minimum wage not just via non-compliance but also by choice of location. Fourth, we assumed that matching probabilities are constant. This assumption is conservative. In particular, if these probabilities were affected by firm search intensity, our result that minimum wages lower labor demand, aggregate employment and output would be exacerbated.

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Figure

Figure 1. Ratio of Formal/Informal Sector Workers by Income Decile



Figure 2A. Real Minimum Wage by Province



Notes: We use a province-specific CPI to deflate minimum wages. Both the CPI and the province level minimum wages are from the Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The BPS provides a CPI for different cities across the country. We match the CPIs of the capital city with each province to create a CPI measure for each province in each year. Each line represents a different province, and the thick line is the simple average across all provinces for each year. The base year for deflating with the CPI is 2007.

Figure 2B: Nominal Minimum wage by District in 2000



Figure 2C: Nominal Minimum wage by District in 2007



Figure 2D: Nominal Minimum wage by District in 2014



Figure 3A. Kernel Densities of Log Earnings Normalized to Minimum Wage



Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Figure 3B. Kernel Densities of Log Average Wage per Firm Normalized to Minimum Wage



Source: Industry Survey (2000~2009)

Figure 4. Spatial Variation in Outcomes and Minimum Wage



Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)
Notes: The graph plots the spatial difference in employment status as a function of the spatially-differenced minimum wage. We define respondents who work either in the government or private sector as formal sector workers (Formal Sector). Among them, respondents working more than 40 hours are defined as full-time workers (Full-Time Formal Sector). Respondents working less than 40 hours are defined as part-time workers (Part-Time Formal Sector). Respondents whose working status are either self-employed or self-employed with family members are categorized as self-employed (Self-Employed). We include unpaid family workers to the previous category, Self-Employed, to define Family Business.

Figure 5. Relative Stance of Minimum Wage and Non-Compliance Ratio to Minimum Wage



Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)
Notes: The graphs come from the sample of full-time formal sector workers who remained in similar-sized firms more than two consecutive survey rounds. Sample of workers in the firms with size between 5 and 199 is categorized in medium-sized firms; more than 200 in large-sized firms accordingly.

Figure 6. Wage Distribution in the model economy.



The full line depicts the cumulative wage distribution in the benchmark economy. The dashed line depicts the cumulative wage distribution in the economy with a minimum wage 200% higher than in the benchmark economy.

Figure 7. Impact of minimum wage increases in the model economy.



The left panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on model output. The right panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on worker income.

Figure 8. Impact of minimum wage increases on the structure of the model economy.



The left panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on the size of the formal economy. The right panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on the share of underpaid workers.

Figure 9. Impact of minimum wage increases in the model economy.



The left panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on model output. The right panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on worker income.

Figure 10. Impact of minimum wage increases on the structure of the model economy.



The left panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on the size of the formal economy. The right panel depicts the impact of minimum wage increases on the share of underpaid workers.

Tables

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Formal and Informal Sector

	Formal Sector Worker	Informal Sector Worker
Employment		
Working Hours per Week	44.884 [18.418]	40.283 [24.644]
Log Real Earning	15.650 [1.334]	15.167 [1.404]
Job Size Category[1]	2.491 [1.316]	1.197 [0.565]
Composition across Industries		
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	0.222 [0.416]	0.770 [0.421]
Mining and Quarrying	0.472 [0.499]	0.510 [0.500]
Manufacturing	0.531 [0.499]	0.446 [0.497]
Electricity, Gas, Water	0.673 [0.469]	0.314 [0.465]
Construction	0.596 [0.491]	0.388 [0.488]
Wholesale, retail, restaurants	0.261 [0.439]	0.713 [0.452]
Transportation, storage, communication	0.473 [0.499]	0.513 [0.500]
Finance, Insurance, real estate, and business services	0.560 [0.496]	0.415 [0.493]
Social services	0.708 [0.455]	0.279 [0.448]
Individual Characteristics		
Share of Male	0.628 [0.483]	0.528 [0.499]
Age	33.373 [10.767]	38.514 [12.580]
Education Level[2]	2.499 [1.142]	1.719 [1.047]
Share of Urban Pop	0.680 [0.466]	0.416 [0.493]
Log Household Asset	21.391 [2.006]	21.408 [1.753]
Share of Sample	0.418	0.565
Sample Number	24,531	33,160

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)
Notes: In each survey year, top and bottom 1 percentile of earnings and household assets are winsorized.
[1] Job size data is divided into 5 different categories: 1. Between 1 and 4; 2. Between 5 and 19; 3. Between 20 and 99; 4. Between 100 and 199; 5. Mover than 200.
[2] Education data is divided into four categories: 0. No education; 1. Elementary 2. Middle School 3. High Scholl 4. University or Above.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Indonesian Manufacturing Plants

	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Employment					
Log Total Workers	218,632	4.158	1.159	2.890	7.835
Log Production Workers	218,583	3.970	1.157	2.197	7.662
Log Non-Production Workers	193,627	2.126	1.443	0	6.203
Average Wage					
Log Average Wage (Rp)					
All	207,560	15.791	0.826	12.557	17.798
Production Workers	207,508	15.720	0.817	12.500	17.707
Non-Production Workers	166,976	16.187	1.033	11.098	19.028
Log Output (Rp)	201,671	22.071	2.068	17.852	27.704
Log Capital (Rp)	127,877	11.986	2.567	6.659	19.323
Log Material (Rp)	218,632	20.308	4.975	0	27.217
Log Fuel (Rp)	218,630	16.440	5.002	0	23.897
% of Foreign Ownership	218,632	0.078	0.268	0	1
% of Government Ownership	218,632	0.107	0.307	0	1
% of Export Status	218,632	0.298	0.458	0	1
Monopsony Index					
Log of Pigou's *E* (Total Workers)	188,291	1.799	1.164	-1.431	5.319
Log of CRS Markup (Total Workers)	201,288	0.242	0.552	-16.557	6.648
Log of CD Markup (Total Workers)	201,288	-0.230	0.745	-16.529	7.321
Log of CRS Markdown (Production Worker)	190,962	-0.823	1.056	-2.853	9.008
Log of CRS Markdown (Non-Production Worker)	154,728	-3.415	1.314	-6.881	11.931
Log of CD Markdown (Production Worker)	190,962	-1.151	1.437	-17.210	9.136
Log of CD Markdown (Non-Production Worker)	154,728	-3.804	1.629	-17.909	11.175

Source: Own calculations from IS surveys. (2000-2009)

Notes: IS data contain information for the number of production-related workers, non-production-related workers, total wage payment for production-related workers, and non-production-related workers. We use this data to calculate average wage payments for production-related workers and non-production-related workers. All values are in constant 2007 Rupiah (Rp). To calculate Pigou's *E*, we use average wage payment across all workers, and output value per worker ((Y/L-wage)/wage). Market shares are computed using 4-digit industries and province. We winsorize the 3 percent in both sides of the markup/markdown estimates of each 2-digit industry in given year.

Table 3. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment Status

VARIABLES	(1) Formal		(2) Full-Time Formal		(3) Part-Time Formal		(4) Self-Employed		(5) Family Business	
Individual FE	0.083**		0.055**		0.069***		-0.004		-0.085**	
	(0.033)		(0.026)		(0.016)		(0.028)		(0.040)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	0.270***	0.036	0.294***	-0.035	-0.026	0.004	-0.241***	-0.036	-0.249***	-0.037
	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.046)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.093)	(0.041)	(0.083)	(0.064)
30 miles	0.293***	0.051	0.319***	0.018	-0.016	-0.001	-0.253**	-0.037	-0.274***	-0.047
	(0.103)	(0.051)	(0.096)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.111)	(0.041)	(0.099)	(0.052)
35 miles	0.246**	0.086	0.268***	0.045	-0.022	-0.020	-0.204**	-0.051	-0.236**	-0.090
	(0.108)	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.105)	(0.053)	(0.106)	(0.064)
40 miles	0.260**	0.074	0.285***	0.050	-0.031	-0.039**	-0.241*	-0.056	-0.254**	-0.085
	(0.121)	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.124)	(0.064)	(0.117)	(0.064)
60 miles	0.220***	0.106*	0.269***	0.082***	-0.051***	-0.011	-0.181**	-0.072	-0.219***	-0.120***
	(0.082)	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.079)	(0.045)	(0.084)	(0.051)
Mean	0.403		0.277		0.131		0.495		0.578	
Observation	51,174		51,174		51,174		51,174		51,174	

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where the dependent variable is the binary indicator for individuals who work in the category in the column heading. We define respondents who work either in the government or private sector as formal sector workers (Formal). Among them, respondents working more than 40 hours are defined as full-time workers (Full-Time Formal). Respondents working less than 40 hours are defined as part-time workers (Part-Time Formal). Respondents whose working status are either self-employed or self-employed with family members are categorized as self-employed (Self-Employed). We include unpaid family workers to the previous category to define Family Business. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) labor force participation status, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.

Table 4. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Plant-Level Employment

VARIABLES	(1) Total Workers		(2) Production Workers		(3) Non-Production Workers	
District FE	-0.029		-0.038		0.078	
	(0.135)		(0.118)		(0.187)	
District FE with district time-trend	-0.141		-0.155		-0.036	
	(0.124)		(0.113)		(0.151)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	0.736**	0.182	0.607*	0.181**	1.443***	0.268***
	(0.292)	(0.089)	(0.313)	(0.086)	(0.204)	(0.092)
30 miles	0.745*	0.058	0.610	0.058	1.449***	0.226
	(0.382)	(0.090)	(0.402)	(0.088)	(0.241)	(0.095)
35 miles	0.646*	0.065	0.526	0.078	1.309***	0.202
	(0.356)	(0.148)	(0.382)	(0.128)	(0.217)	(0.147)
40 miles	0.565	0.050	0.449	0.051	1.194***	0.190
	(0.343)	(0.170)	(0.350)	(0.157)	(0.254)	(0.146)
60 miles	0.650*	0.123	0.525*	0.110	1.351***	0.267
	(0.300)	(0.187)	(0.301)	(0.165)	(0.297)	(0.197)
Mean	4.138		3.952		2.095	
Observations	209,462		209,414		184,819	

Source: Industry Surveys (2000~2009)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where the dependent variable is the log values of dependent variables in the column heading. Industry Survey contains information for the number of production-related workers (Production Workers), and other workers (Non-production Workers) each plant hired. We combine the two different sets of workers hired in each plant to create the category, "Total Workers." Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: percentage of government ownership, foreigner ownership, log values of used material, log of provincial GDP, and export status.

Table 5. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Income by Employment Status

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Full-Time Wage Earner									
	All		Sub-Minimum Wage Workers Initial Year		Over-Minimum Wage Workers Initial Year		Part-Time Wage Earner		Self-Employed Profit Earner	
Individual FE	0.460***		0.671***		0.515***		-0.238		0.247*	
	(0.094)		(0.199)		(0.089)		(0.268)		(0.131)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	1.137***	0.796***	1.067***	0.592***	0.846***	1.100***	0.599	-0.112	0.766**	0.341
	(0.264)	(0.246)	(0.196)	(0.223)	(0.137)	(0.210)	(0.457)	(0.484)	(0.307)	(0.321)
30 miles	1.475***	1.057***	1.345***	1.100***	1.007***	1.162***	1.013*	0.214	0.712**	0.106
	(0.354)	(0.266)	(0.260)	(0.248)	(0.138)	(0.230)	(0.520)	(0.388)	(0.331)	(0.334)
35 miles	1.195***	0.924***	1.068***	1.136***	0.882***	1.003***	0.776**	0.328	0.690***	-0.075
	(0.223)	(0.184)	(0.192)	(0.217)	(0.116)	(0.152)	(0.371)	(0.292)	(0.249)	(0.228)
40 miles	1.133***	0.872***	1.085***	1.291***	0.785***	0.786***	0.636*	0.403	0.678***	-0.013
	(0.194)	(0.140)	(0.172)	(0.221)	(0.100)	(0.171)	(0.330)	(0.245)	(0.195)	(0.136)
60 miles	1.083***	0.805***	1.050***	1.113***	0.801***	0.782***	0.567***	0.382*	0.727***	0.068
	(0.087)	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.207)	(0.088)	(0.127)	(0.180)	(0.212)	(0.137)	(0.102)
Mean	15.956		15.095		16.598		15.324		15.097	
Observations	13,926		5,950		7,976		6,566		18,522	

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where each dependent variable is the log values of earning for individuals who work in the category in the column heading. We define respondents who work either in the government or private sector as formal sector wage earners. Among them, respondents working more than 40 hours are defined as full-time wage workers. We further divide the sample into the two different groups: respondents whose wage at the initial year of sampling is smaller than minimum wage (Sub-Minimum Wage Workers), and respondents whose wage at the initial year of sampling is higher than minimum wage (Over-Minimum Wage Workers). Respondents working less than 40 hours are defined as part-time workers (Part-Time Formal). Respondents whose working status are self-employed, self-employed with family members or unpaid family workers are defined as family business profit earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) labor force participation status, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.

Table 6. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Average Wage

VARIABLES	(1) Log Wage		(2) Log Wage (Production Workers)		(3) Log Wage (Non-Production Workers)	
District FE	0.467***		0.484***		0.403***	
	(0.064)		(0.063)		(0.058)	
District FE with district time-trend	0.339***		0.368***		0.311***	
	(0.057)		(0.047)		(0.061)	
	SD	DSD	SD	DSD	SD	DSD
25 miles	1.220***	0.291***	1.105***	0.271***	1.326***	0.482***
	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.231)	(0.065)
30 miles	1.319***	0.316***	1.209***	0.304***	1.346***	0.522***
	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.247)	(0.067)
35 miles	1.281***	0.300***	1.156***	0.292***	1.306***	0.472***
	(0.104)	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.268)	(0.086)
40 miles	1.152***	0.346***	1.030***	0.323***	1.187***	0.541***
	(0.174)	(0.097)	(0.150)	(0.072)	(0.331)	(0.102)
60 miles	1.168***	0.486***	1.048***	0.483***	1.159***	0.474***
	(0.200)	(0.162)	(0.177)	(0.147)	(0.354)	(0.162)
Mean	15.789		15.720		16.187	
Observations	207,575		207,507		166,975	

Source: Industry Surveys (2000~2009)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where the dependent variable is the log values of dependent variables in the column heading. Industry Survey contains information for the number of production-related workers (Production Workers), and other workers (Non-production Workers) each plant hired. We combine the two different sets of workers hired in each plant to create the category, "Total Workers." Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: percentage of government ownership and foreigner ownership respectively, log values of used material, log of provincial GDP, and export status.

Table 7. The effect of minimum wage on Monopsony (FE and SD)

VARIABLES	(1) Pigou's E		(2) Markdowns (CRS)		(3) Markdowns (CRS)		(4) Markdown (CD)		(5) Markdown (CD)		(6) Markup		(7) Markup	
			Production Workers		Non-Production Workers		Production Workers		Non-Production Workers		CRS		CD	
FE	-0.245***		-0.170***		-0.138		-0.244***		-0.201		-0.038		0.070	
	(0.096)		(0.083)		(0.103)		(0.111)		(0.151)		(0.080)		(0.050)	
FE with district time-trend	-0.111*		-0.061		-0.127**		-0.100		-0.172***		-0.018		0.031	
	(0.065)		(0.086)		(0.050)		(0.106)		(0.055)		(0.040)		(0.046)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	-0.500**	-0.218	0.250	-0.255	-0.831***	-0.293**	0.486	-0.280	-0.629**	-0.293*	0.181***	-0.038	0.010	0.198***
	(0.247)	(0.174)	(0.249)	(0.199)	(0.156)	(0.143)	(0.424)	(0.230)	(0.291)	(0.164)	(0.045)	(0.121)	(0.175)	(0.055)
30 miles	-0.465	-0.051	0.318	-0.140	-0.887***	-0.347**	0.548	-0.120	-0.681*	-0.303	0.200***	-0.003	0.020	0.177***
	(0.285)	(0.141)	(0.296)	(0.161)	(0.218)	(0.168)	(0.526)	(0.210)	(0.408)	(0.206)	(0.050)	(0.084)	(0.240)	(0.052)
35 miles	-0.575***	-0.039	0.147	-0.114	-0.882***	-0.231	0.307	-0.064	-0.744**	-0.163	0.168***	-0.035	0.034	0.072
	(0.221)	(0.134)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.190)	(0.180)	(0.353)	(0.305)	(0.311)	(0.256)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.165)	(0.055)
40 miles	-0.520*	0.035	0.170	-0.033	-0.829***	-0.279*	0.313	-0.024	-0.699	-0.253	0.133**	-0.057	0.008	0.058
	(0.267)	(0.106)	(0.224)	(0.186)	(0.302)	(0.152)	(0.365)	(0.256)	(0.434)	(0.200)	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.186)	(0.098)
60 miles	-0.515***	-0.117**	0.218*	-0.017	-0.787***	-0.046	0.411*	-0.013	-0.591*	0.010	0.133***	-0.005	-0.044	0.083***
	(0.215)	(0.052)	(0.125)	(0.147)	(0.242)	(0.112)	(0.213)	(0.164)	(0.318)	(0.140)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.104)	(0.021)
Mean	1.799		-0.823		-3.415		-1.151		-3.804		0.228		-0.229	
Observations	188,289		190,961		154,727		190,961		154,727		192,774		192,774	

Source: Industry Surveys (2000~2009)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where the dependent variable is the log values of dependent variables in the column heading. Each column represents market distortion index calculated with different methods and sample. For the first column, total output per worker is used to calculate Pigou's *E* ((Y/L-wage)/wage). For the next six columns, we apply Brooks et al (2021) to estimate market distortion index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: percentage of government ownership and foreigner ownership respectively, log values of used material, log of provincial GDP, and export status.

Table 8. Tests for Partial Compliance with Legal Minimum Wages

	Workers in Medium Firms (5~199) (Treatment Group) and Large Firms (>200) (Control Group)	
2014 × T	0.066**	0.074**
	(0.032)	(0.031)
2007 × T		0.038
		(0.023)
2000 × T		-0.059
		(0.045)
Individual, Year, Occupation FE	Yes	Yes
Macro Variables	Yes	Yes
Number of Observation	10,736	10,736

Sources: : Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on the interaction of dummies (treatment group dummy and year dummies) where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for non-compliant. The control group consists of full-time workers who remained in firms with more than 200 employees. The treatment group consists of full-time workers who remained in firms with 5-199 employees. Clustered-robust standard errors by the province in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) labor force participation status, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.

Table 9. Calibration Parameters

Parameter	Interpretation	Value
Direct		
ρ	Discount rate	0.05
μ_z	Mean of log worker prod. distrib.	0
μ_p	Mean of log firm prod. distrib.	2
σ_p	S.d. of log firm prod. distrib.	0.1
λ_z	Job finding rate by z	0.17-0.29
δ_z	Job loss rate by z	0.02-0.18
Indirect		
σ_z	S.d. of log worker prod. distrib.	0.9062
μ	Mean of log informal inc. dist.	0.6138
σ	S.d. of log informal inc. dist.	0.2773
ω_{min}	Minimum wage	-
κ	Detection probability	0.25
ζ	Correlation param. linking x and z	1.6421

Table 10. Calibration Statistics

Statistics	Data Value	Model Value
Size of the formal sector	47%	44%
$w_{\min} \div$ median wage	0.9	0.8
CV formal earnings	1.1	0.9
CV of informal earnings	1.6	1.5
Mean formal $\div$ mean informal earnings	1.2	1.3
Share of underpaid workers	0.5	0.5

Appendix

A. Construction of Household Asset Variable, Informality (IFLS) and Capital Variables (IS)

Minimum Wage is annualized and deflated by the CPI. The Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) provides constructed CPIs for cities across the country. Matching the CPIs of the capital city with each province, we have created a CPI measure for provinces across the years. We choose 2007 as the base year.

Self-reported Income (IFLS) is annualized and deflated by the CPI to match annualizedï¿œminimum wage levels. The IFLS data offers only information on the total salary (monetary remuneration and other benefits), and we cannot separate monetary compensation from other benefits.

Household Asset (IFLS) is the total summation of the various household asset values. The variable includes the houses and buildings occupied by the household, non-agricultural land, livestock/fishpond, vehicles (cars, boats, bicycles, motorbikes), household appliances (radio, tape recorder, TV, fridge, sewing or washing machine, computer), saving/certificate, receivables, jewelry, furniture, and utensils. There is some sample whose asset value data is missing. Considering that the questionnaire contains comprehensive items, including the value of utensils, it is reasonable to assume that those samples are misreported. We do not include those samples in our regression analysis. IFLS consists of several books, and respondents sometimes choose to answer in book two or three. Unfortunately, the asset categories in book3 of IFLS5 are inconsistent with book2 of IFLS5 and the rest of the IFLS series. That is, it does not contain information on several asset values available in the previous rounds. These are poultry, livestock/fishpond, hard stem plants not used for farm or non-farm business, vehicles, household appliances, furniture, and utensils. We impute the missing value by applying the standard Oaxaca method to deal with the missing information. Since we have information for a sample who answered in book 2, we aggregate the list of items in book 3 and the list of items not listed in book 3. Using these two values, we proceed with the standard Oaxaca method and impute values for the missing items

for the information in book 3 and construct a household asset value comparable with samples who answered in book2. We deflate the value of the household assets by province-level CPI.

Education Level (IFLS) is divided into four categories. 0. No education, 1. Elementary, 2. Middle School, 3. High School, 4. University or above.

Informal sector workers (IFLS) BPS uses two criteria, employment type and industry sector, to define (in)formal sector activities (World Bank 2010). All full-time employees in the private and government sector, as well as employers with permanent workers, are considered formal according to BPS. Informal employment category includes self-employment, family worker, and casual employee. The category of self-employment with family workers is where things get complicated. BPS views this category as informal if they work in the agricultural sector, but as formal if they work in the non-agricultural sector. However, existing literature on the Indonesian labour market classifies self-employed with family workers as informal employees regardless of their industry, which differs from BPS definition (Comola & de Mello, 2011; Hohberg & Lay, 2015; Magruder, 2013). We adhere to the literature in this regard and consider all self-employed with family workers as informal.[19] [20] Thus, we regard full-time workers in private or government sector as formal sector workers.[21] Self-employed, self-employed with family members, casual workers and unpaid family workers are regarded as informal sector workers. According to Magruder (2013) and Ulyssea (2018), not all full-time workers in the private sector or the public sector are recruited formally; a significant proportion of full-time wage earners who are employed by formally registered firms are hired "off the books." Even though IFLS data cannot precisely identify this type of informality, non-compliance with minimum wage regulations may be used as a proxy for informally hired labourers by formally registered businesses. The present study designates this hiring practice from firms' perspective as non-compliance, as opposed to informally

[19] It is reasonable to follow the literature in this regard, as it is doubtful that the involvement of a family member will result in a business that is sufficiently large for self-employed individuals to register and pay taxes.

[20] World Bank Report (2010) also assumes informality in terms of employment type only: it uses self-employed with and without workers and family workers as proxies for the informality rate in Indonesia. (pp.57)

[21] Note that our sample does not include self-employed with permanent workers. It is less than 2% of the working population, and including this sample in the regression analysis has only marginal effects on the coefficients. Considering our emphasis on the (in)formalization mechanism between self-employment and workers in the formal sector, we excluded this category from our sample.

hired employees.

Capital (IS) is measured as the estimated value of machinery and equipment on December 31 of the year. When the capital value is not reported, we use the reported value of the capital in the previous year to construct the missing capital value. We assume that $K_{it} = 0.9K_{i,t-1} + I_{i,t-1}$ where I is an investment for machinery and equipment. K_{it} and I_{it} are the real values deflated to 2007 rupiah using sector-specific deflators based on Wholesale Price Indices provided by Peter Brummund (2013).

Output, Material, and Fuel (IS) are measured as the total reported value of output produced, raw materials, and fuels used by the plant during the calendar year, respectively. These were deflated to 2007 rupiah using sector-specific deflators based on Wholesale Price Indices provided by Peter Brummund (2013).

Average Total Production Workers (IS) is the average number of workers, paid and unpaid, used per working day.

Other Total Production Workers (IS) is the average number of all others, paid and unpaid, used per working day.

Average Total Wage (IS) is constructed as the sum of cash wages/salary and in-kind benefits per production worker, and per non-production workers deflated to 2007 rupiah using provincial consumer price index obtained from the BPS.

Average Wage (IS) is constructed as the cash wages/salary, and per production worker and per non-production workers deflated to 2007 rupiah using provincial consumer price index obtained from BPS.

B. Monopsony Indices

B.1. Pigou's E (1924)

The traditional index for monopsony comes from Pigou (1924), where a monopsonistic employer's maximization problem can be written as

$$Max_L\ \pi(L) = pF(L) - w(L)L$$

where $\pi(.)$ is firm profit, $F(.)$ is the firm production function that only requires labor, and $w(.)$ is the wage function. The first order condition of this problem imply the following wage setting rule:

$$\epsilon^{-1} = \frac{\partial w}{\partial L}\frac{L}{w} = \frac{pF'(L) - w(L)}{w(L)}$$

where ϵ is wage elasticity of labor supply and $pF'(L)$ is firm's marginal revenue of labor product. In a perfectly competitive labor market where wage elasticity approaches infinity, a slight wage decrease will cause all workers to leave their current employer. Instead, if the employer operates in a monopsonistic labor market, he may retain workers by paying them a lower salary. This monopsony index may also be examined via its right-hand side equation, in which the normalized difference between marginal labor productivity and wage payment represents the rate of labor market imperfection. Under the premise of a perfect market, companies are supposed to employ laborers until the marginal value of the final worker recruited matches the wage paid to that person. If a gap occurs, especially when the marginal value of adding one additional worker is greater than the wage payment, this may indicate monopsony activity on the part of employers.

To accurately estimate Pigou's E, one should calculate an unbiased estimate of the marginal value of labor product, $pF'(L)$, and the specific wage payment, $w(L)$, to each worker. However, our IS data only provides each plant's average wage, and IS data for 2002 and 2003 lack information on plant ID: applying the standard semi-parametric approach for the marginal product of labor estimation requires panel data, limiting our sample to 2004-2009. Thus, we employ average labor productivity, y/L, as a proxy for the marginal value labor product, $pF'(L)$, and average wage payment of the plant as a proxy for $w(L)$. With this method, we can use a full sample between 2000 and 2009.

B.2. Hershbein et al.(2022), Brooks et al. (2021)

Hershbein et al.(2022) and Brooks et al.(2021) extend the standard markup index of de Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to construct monopsony indices, often known as markdowns. The basic idea of de Loecker and Warzynski (2012) is that the first-order condition may be used to calculate the firm-specific markup as the ratio of the factor's output elasticity to its firm-specific factor payment share for any flexibly chosen, price-taking input. Material input is typically considered to operate in a competitive market; firms generally accept the material price as given. Under a competitive output market, firms employ material, the price-taking input, until the output elasticity of the material equals the payment. Suppose there is a disparity between the production elasticity and payment share of material. In that case, it is attributed to the imperfection of the output market: companies exert market power by not fully using materials to produce less and retain higher prices for the goods they produce.

One can do the same exercise with labor input assumed to operate in an imperfect market. Unlike the case of material input, the discrepancy between labor's output elasticity and wage payment is assumed to capture not only the output market imperfection but also input market imperfection. The mark-down index is then calculated by dividing the two mark-up indices to separate input market concentration from output market imperfection. The construction of the index can be written as:

$$\mu_{it} = \frac{\mu_{it}^{L}}{\mu_{it}^{M}}$$

where $\mu_{it}^{j} \equiv \frac{\frac{\partial log(F_{it})}{\partial log(x_{it}^{j})}}{\frac{q_{it}^{j} x_{it}^{j}}{p_{it} y_{it}}} \equiv \frac{\theta_{it}^{j}}{\alpha_{it}^{j}}$. $\theta_{it}^{j} = \frac{\partial log(F_{it})}{\partial log(x_{it}^{j})}$ denotes input j's output elasticity and $\alpha_{it}^{j} = \frac{p_{it}^{j} x_{it}^{j}}{p_{it} y_{it}}$ is input j's share on the total payment. Markdown should be equal to one if there is no market power in the labor market.

The standard approach (de Loecker and Warzynski (2012)) is to estimate the production function by applying the method of Ackerberg et al. (2015). In our Indonesian plant-level data, we do not have plant ID for 2002 and 2003, limiting us to the sample from 2004 to 2009 had we resorted to the methodology. Also, as pointed out by Ackerberg (2015), the production

function should be estimated with value-added production function or gross output production function where materials are Leontief. In each of these particular instances, estimating the output elasticity for materials and the precise parameter required to apply the de Loecker and Warzynski (2012) model is impossible. Thus we follow Hershbein et al.(2022) and Brooks et al. (2021) and implement their two proposed methods to calculate markups and markdowns.

The first method uses gross profit margin as an estimate for markup, where the precise formula can be written as:

$$\frac{p_t y_{it}}{p_t^K x_{it}^K + p_t^L x_{it}^L + p_t^M x_{it}^M + p_t^F x_{it}^F}$$

We measure firm's sales (py), labor payment ($p^L x^L$),material expenditure ($p^M x^M$),and fuel expenditure ($p^F x^F$) directly from the data. As we do not have the payment to capital ($p^K x^K$), but only the stock of capital (x^K), As long as the production function is constant returns to scale and the firm is price-taking in its inputs, the gross profit margin is a reasonable approximation of the markup. We follow Brooks et al. (2021) and assume a standard rate of return $R = \delta + r = 0.15$ where depreciation rate, δ, is 0.05 and interest rate, r, is 0.10. This measure of markups is not appropriate in the presence of markdowns since it attributes all profits to markups (increased revenues per unit of output) when a portion of profits would be attributable to markdowns (lower costs per unit of output). This index is termed CRS markup.

Another markup index suggested by Hershbein et al. (2022) and Brooks et al. (2021) is CD markup. CD markup uses a markup formula, $\mu_{it}^M \equiv \frac{\frac{\partial log(F_{it})}{\partial log(x_{it}^M)}}{\frac{p_{it}^M x_{it}^M}{p_{it} y_{it}}} \equiv \frac{\theta_{it}^M}{\alpha_{it}^M}$, and assumes that the production function is Cobb-Douglas to the material. Under this strong functional assumption, the output elasticity of materials is constant for all firms ($\theta_{it}^M = \theta^M$), and we choose $\theta^M = 0.69$ so that the average level of our markups equals the average measured using the CRS method. This method has a stronger assumption than CRS markup in that the index assumes the same output elasticity of materials across all firms. However, unlike CRS markup, the index allows for potential monopsony power in the factor markets other than material input and is robust for non-CRS production functions.

For the next step, we construct labor-based markup using the CD approach, assuming a constant θ^L for all firms ($\theta^L_{it} = \theta^L$). Using the labor-based markup and material-based markup, we proceed to construct the markdown index, $\frac{\mu^L_{it}}{\mu^M_{it}}$. This can be expressed differently based on whether we use either the CRS or CD markdown:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu^{CRS}_{it} = \frac{\mu^L_{it}}{\mu^M_{it}} = &\quad \theta^L \frac{\left(p^K_t x^K_{it} + p^L_t x^L_{it} + p^M_t x^M_{it} + p^F_t x^F_{it}\right)}{p^L_t x^L_{it}} \\ \mu^{CD}_{it} = \frac{\mu^L_{it}}{\mu^M_{it}} = &\quad \frac{\theta^L}{\theta^M} \frac{p^M_t x^M_{it}}{p^L_{it} x^L_{it}} \end{aligned}$$

If we assume that the output elasticity of labor is constant over all firms, then CRS markup, μ^{CRS}_{it}, essentially boils down to the inverse ratio of the contribution of wage payment over the total payment. The index indicates that labor market imperfection diminishes as the ratio of wage payment to total payment increases. There are several assumptions to justify this index. First, the index is only valid if laborers' contribution to output production does not change across years of investigation. Second, this index assumes that firms do not have monopsony power except in the labor market. For instance, the presence of input market concentration on capital will bias the index. Compare to μ^{CRS}_{it}, μ^{CD}_{it} index is based on a weaker assumption in that it requires only one factor that firms do not exercise monopsony power. This substantial advantage from the weaker assumption on the factor market is countered by the stronger functional assumption for material inputs in the Cobb-Douglas production function.

The following step is to normalize our created markdown indices based on the assumption that, in the absence of market power in the factor market, the markdown should equal one. Specifically, we follow Brooks et al. (2021) to estimate the following equation:

$$\frac{\mu^L_{it}}{\mu^M_{it}} = \tau_t + \delta_i + \beta s^L_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $s^L_{it} = \frac{p^L_t x^L_{it}}{\sum^n_i p^L_t x^L_{it}}$ denotes firm i' share in the labor market at time t. To compute firms' labor market share, we assume that labor is segmented both geometrically (province-level) and by the type of work (ISIC 4-digit industries). After calculating each firm's labor share in the

market, we rescale the ratio, $\frac{\mu_{it}^L}{\mu_{it}^M}$, so that the average intercept of the above equation is 1. Rescaling guarantees that removing labor market power (i.e., the component of this markdown that changes with labor market share) is equivalent to setting the average markdown to 1.

C. Robustness Check-Migration

We report the SD, DSD, and TWFE estimation results from the IFLS data, excluding individuals who migrated to different districts during the sample period. The migrating population could skew statistics if informally employed individuals crossed the provinces to search for higher-paying formal sector jobs or unemployed workers migrate out of higher minimum wage provinces to search for jobs. We do a robustness analysis excluding individuals who migrated from the initial place where observation began. This analysis will allow us to examine how much the migrating population could contaminate our estimation. The migrating population is approximately 7.8 percent for our three rounds of the IFLS sample. We report estimates of minimum wage impact on employment, wages, and non-compliance incidence.

Our estimation results with the TWFE estimator show that the positive effect on formal sector employment decreases when excluding the migrated population. This finding can be interpreted as evidence for some people migrating into the provinces with a higher minimum wage to find a formal sector job. Finally, DSD, SD, and TWFE estimation results for income and non-compliance show similar coefficients compared to the results with the migrated population. Overall, our estimation results, excluding the sample of migration populations, show robust results.

D. Model

D1. Proof for $H_z(x) = D_z(R_z(x))$

In this Appendix, we show that $H_z(x) = D_z(R_z(x))$. As H_z and D_z are CDF of outside option and reservation wage respectively, we only need to show that $R_z(x)$ is monotonically increasing in x. From

$$R_z(x) = x + (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \int_{R_z(x)}^{\bar{w_z}} \frac{1-F_z(y)}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(y))} dy$$

we use Leibniz's formula to derive

$$\frac{\partial R_z(x)}{\partial x} = 1 - (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right) \frac{\partial R_z(x)}{\partial x}$$

$$\frac{\partial R_z(x)}{\partial x} \left[1 + (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right) \right] = 1$$

As $0 < \lambda_z^i < \lambda_z^e < 1$, we can deduce $-1 < (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right) < 0$. As $0 < \rho,\ \delta_z < 1$, we have

$$-1 < (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right) < 0$$

$$0 < 1 + (\lambda_z^i - \lambda_z^e) \left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right) < 1$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial R_z(x)}{\partial x} > \frac{1}{1+(\lambda_z^i-\lambda_z^e)\left(\frac{1-F_z(R_z(x))}{\rho+\delta_z+\lambda_z^e(1-F_z(R_z(x)))} \right)} > 0$$

As $R_z(x)$ increases monotonically with x, now we proved $H_z(x) = D_z(R_z(x))$.

D2. Derivation on $n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z)$

Now, we define the steady-state measure of the informal sector and the labor supply. Let $I_z(R_z(x)|F_z)$ denote the steady-state number for informal sector workers in labor market z whose reservation wage is less than or equal to $R_z(x)$, conditional on the wage offer distribution F_z. As $\frac{\delta_z}{\delta_z+\lambda_z^i[1-F_z(R_z(x))]}$ denotes the rate of inflow to the informal sector at the steady state for workers whose reservation wage is $R_z(x)$, we can write $I_z(R_z(x)|F_z)$ as

$$\text{(D2.1) } I_z(R_z(x)|F_z) = \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{R_z(x)} \left(\frac{\delta_z m_z}{\delta_z + \lambda_z^i[1-F_z(y)]}\right) dD_z(y)$$

where $\underline{R}_z$ denote the lowest reservation wage for workers with ability z, $\underline{R}_z = R_z(\underline{x})$. For the further discussion, we also denote highest reservation wage for workers with ability z as $\overline{R}_z = R_z(\overline{x})$. Let the steady-state number of workers employed with a wage no greater than $\widetilde{\omega}$ be given by $G_z(\widetilde{\omega})(m_z - I_z)$, where $I_z = I_z(\overline{R}_z|F_z)$ is the total ratio of informal sector workers, and $G_z(\widetilde{\omega})$ is the distribution of earning among formal sector workers whose ability is z. At the steady-state, the flow of workers leaving employers offering a wage no greater than $\widetilde{\omega}$ equals to the flow of workers returning to such employers,

$$\text{(D2.2) } (\delta_z + \lambda_z^e(1 - F_z(\widetilde{\omega}))G_z(\widetilde{\omega})(m_z - I_z) = \lambda_z^i \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}} (F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(R_z(x)))dI_z(R_z(x)|F_z)$$

where $F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(R_z(x))$ represents the share of workers whose reservation wage is $R_z(x)$ who will accept an offer less than or equal to $\widetilde{\omega}$, and $dI_z(R_z(x)|F_z)$ measure of informal sector workers with reservation wage $R_z(x)$. From (D2.1), we have $[1 + k_z^i(1 - F_z(R_z(x)))]dI_z(R_z(x)|F_z) = m_z dD_z(R_z(x))$. We can now express (D2.2) as follows:

$$G_z(\widetilde{\omega})(m_z - I_z) = \frac{k_z^i \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}} (F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(y))dI_z(y|F)}{(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}))} = \frac{k_z^i m_z}{(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}))} \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}} \frac{(F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(y)}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y))} dD_z(y)$$

From this expression, we use integration by parts to derive

$$\int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}} \frac{(F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(y))}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y)))} dD_z(y) = \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}} D_z(y) \left(\frac{1}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y))} + \frac{k_z^i(F_z(\widetilde{\omega}) - F_z(y))}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y))^2}\right) dF_z(y).$$

The steady-state number of workers earning a wage in the interval $[\widetilde{\omega} - \epsilon, \widetilde{\omega}]$ is represented by $dG_z(\widetilde{\omega})(m_z - I_z)$, while $dF_z(\widetilde{\omega})$ is the measure of firms offering an expected wage payment, $\widetilde{\omega}$, in the same interval. Thus, the measure of workers per firm offering a wage, $\widetilde{\omega}$, at the steady state can be expressed as

$$n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|F_z, D_z) = \frac{(m_z - I_z)dG_z(\widetilde{\omega})}{dF_z(\widetilde{\omega})} = \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega})}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})))(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})))}$$

D3. Proofs on Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1: Let $\widetilde{\omega}^1$ and $\widetilde{\omega}^2$ be the equilibrium wage of the firms whose productivity is p_1 and p_2 accordingly. Assume that $p_2 > p_1$. Then,

$$(p_2 z - \widetilde{\omega}^2) \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^2)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])} \geq ((p_2 z - \widetilde{\omega}^1) \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^1)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^1)])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^1)])}$$

$$> (p_1 z - \widetilde{\omega}^1) \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^1)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])} \geq (p_1 z - \widetilde{\omega}^2) \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^2)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (p_2 - p_1) z \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^2)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])} > (p_2 - p_1) z \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^1)}{(1+k_z^i[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])(1+k_z^e[1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega})])}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \widetilde{\omega}^2 > \widetilde{\omega}^1$$

$Q.E.D.$ □

Proof of Proposition 2: We now derive equation (9).

Suppose there is an unique equilibrium solution, $F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)$, to the wage posting game for all $p \in [\underline{p}, \overline{p}]$ (Bontemps et al. 2000). Let us define $J_z(p)$ that corresponds to the equilibrium wage distribution; $F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*(p)) = J_z(p)$, where $\widetilde{\omega}^*(p)$ is equilibrium wage that corresponds with firm with productivity p. Then $J_z(p)$ is interpreted as the proportion of employers with productivity no greater than p.

Given that there is a one-on-one matching between firm's productivity and the equilibrium wage distribution, the proportion of workers whose reservation wage is no greater than $\widetilde{\omega}^*$, $D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*(p))$, can be also expressed in terms of the firm's productivity. Assume $J_z(p)$ is continuous and differentiable with support $[\underline{p}, \overline{p}]$. From $F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*(p)) = J_z(p)$, we can derive $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = F_z^{-1}(J_z(p))$. We substitute this into $D_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p))$, so that $D_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) = D_z(F_z^{-1}(J_z(p))) = (D_z \circ F_z^{-1} \circ J_z)(p) = Q_z(p)$. Thus, $Q_z(p)$ refers to the proportion of workers that a firm with productivity p can attract. Thus from $F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) = J_z(p)$ and $D_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) = Q_z(p)$, we can derive the following: $F_z'(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p))\widetilde{\omega}_z^{*\prime}(p) = J_z'(p)$ and $D_z'(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p))\widetilde{\omega}_z^{*\prime}(p) = Q_z'(p)$. As all wage offers must be at least as great as the lowest reservation wage, $\underline{R}_z$, only employers with productivity $pz \geq \underline{R}_z$ can make a profit and participate in the labor market z. Hence without loss of generality, we infer $\underline{p} = \frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}$ and

$p \in (\frac{R_z}{z}, \overline{p}]$. Now we can derive the equilibrium wage associated with the employer's productivity (Equation (9)) from the producers' profit maximization problem (Equation (8)).

From (8), We can derive

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}) \left[\frac{n_z^{'}(\widetilde{\omega}|D_z,F_z)}{n_z(\widetilde{\omega}|D_z,F_z)}\right] = 1$$

Substituting (7) into the equation, we get

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}^*) \left[\frac{D_z^{'}(\widetilde{\omega}^*)\big(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*))\big)(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)))+D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)\Big[k_z^iF_z^{'}(\widetilde{\omega}^*)(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)))+k_z^eF_z^{'}(\widetilde{\omega}^*)\big(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*))\big)\Big]}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)))(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)))D_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)}\right] = 1$$

Substituting the corresponding productivity distribution ($D_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) = Q_z(p)$, $D_z^{'}(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p))\widetilde{\omega}_z^{*'}(p) = Q_z^{'}(p)$) into equation, we get

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) \left[\frac{Q_z^{'}(p)\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\big)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))+Q_z(p)\Big[k_z^iJ_z^{'}(p)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))+k_z^eJ_z^{'}(p)\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\big)\Big]}{(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p)))(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))Q_z(p)\widetilde{\omega}_z^{*'}(p)}\right] = 1$$

This equation can be rearranged as

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) \left[\frac{Q_z^{'}(p)}{Q_z(p)} + \frac{\Big[k_z^iJ_z^{'}(p)(1+k_z^e[1-J_z(p))+k_z^eJ_z^{'}(p)\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\big)\Big]}{(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p)))(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))}\right] = \widetilde{\omega}_z^{*'}(p)$$

Now let us define $B_z(p) = -log[(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p)))(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))]$ and $S_z(p) = log(Q_z(p))$. Then $B_z^{'}(p) = \frac{\Big[k_z^iJ_z^{'}(p)(1+k_z^e[1-J_z(p))+k_z^eJ_z^{'}(p)\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\big)\Big]}{(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p)))(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))}$ and $S_z^{'}(p) = \frac{Q_z^{'}(p)}{Q_z(p)}$. We can re-write the above equation as

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)) \left[S_z^{'}(p) + B_z^{'}(p)\right] = \widetilde{\omega}_z^{*'}(p)$$

Let us define $K_z(p) = S_z(p) + B_z(p)$ so that $K_z^{'}(p) = S_z^{'}(p) + B_z^{'}(p)$. Rewriting the equation, we get

$$(pz - \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p))K_z^{'}(p) = \widetilde{\omega}_z^{*'}(p)$$

Multiplying the above equation with the integrating factor, $\mu_z(p) = e^{K_z(p)}$, on both sides and rearranging, we get

$$[\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)\mu_z(p)]' = pz\mu_z'(p)$$

Integrating both sides, we get

$$\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)\mu_z(p) = z\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} y\mu_z'(y)dy + A$$

$$\iff \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)e^{K_z(p)} = z\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} yK_z'(y)e^{K_z(y)}dy + A$$

From $\left(ye^{K_z(y)}\right)' = e^{K_z(y)} + yK_z'(y)e^{K_z(y)}$, we deduce$\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} yK_z'(y)e^{K_z(y)}dy = \int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} \left[ye^{K_z(y)}\right]' dy - \int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} e^{K_z(y)}dy$, and thus we can rewrite the above equation as

$$\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = pz + e^{-K_z(p)}\left[A - be^{K_z(\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z})}\right] - e^{-K_z(p)}z\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} e^{K_z(y)}dy$$

As the wage offered by the least productive firm with $\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}$ is $\underline{R}_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}) = \underline{R}_z)$, and $e^{-K_z(\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z})}z\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}} e^{K_z(y)}dy = 0$, we can infer$A = be^{K_z(\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z})}$. We can re-write the above equation as

$$\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = z\left[p - e^{-K_z(p)}\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} e^{K_z(y)}dy\right]$$

$$\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = z\left[p - e^{-(S_z(p)+B_z(p))}\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} e^{(S_z(y)+B_z(y))}dy\right]$$

$$(9)\ \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p) = z\left[p - \int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} \frac{\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\right)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))Q_z(y)}{(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(y)))(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(y)))Q_z(p)}dy\right]$$

Now we show $\frac{\partial\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)}{\partial p} > 0$ to check whether the closed form soltuion $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$ still satisfies the initial assumption on the monotone increasing correspondence between $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*$ and p. Using Leibniz's formula, we can take a derivative with respect to p, and then

$$\frac{\partial\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)}{\partial p} =$$
$$z\left[\int_{\frac{\underline{R}_z}{z}}^{p} \frac{\left[k_z^i J_z'(p)\left(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p))\right)+k_z^e J_z'(p)\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\right)\right]Q_z(p)+\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(y))\right)\left(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(y))\right)Q_z'(p)}{[Q_z(p)]^2}\frac{Q_z(y)}{\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(y))\right)}dy\right] > 0$$

Thus, $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$ monotonically increases with p.

Q.E.D. □

Proof of Proposition 3:

$$\frac{\partial \widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)}{\partial \omega_m} = \left[\kappa \frac{\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\big)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))}{\big(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\big)\big(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\big)}\right]\left[\frac{Q_z\big(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}\big)}{Q_z(p)}\right] > 0$$

Q.E.D. □

Proof of Proposition 4: Let us denote $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$ in equation (9) as $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*$. From equation (7) and Proposition 3, we can deduce the following equation for the firms who still remain in the market (whose productivity p is greater than $\frac{\kappa_z\omega_{min}}{z}$):

$$\frac{\partial n_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*)}{\partial \omega_{min}} = \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z'(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*)\big(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)\big(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)+k_z^i m_z D_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*)\big[k_z^i F_z'(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*)\big(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)+k_z^e F_z'(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*)\big(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)\big]}{\big(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)^2\big(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z^*))\big)^2}\frac{\partial \widetilde{\omega}_z^*}{\partial \omega_{min}}$$

From Proposition 3, we know that the minimum wage increase raises the whole wage distribution, so that $\frac{\partial n_z(\widetilde{\omega}^*)}{\partial \omega_{min}} > 0$ for firms whose productivity is greater than $\frac{\kappa_z\omega_{min}}{z}\big(p > \frac{\kappa_z\omega_{min}}{z}\big)$. This portion of increased employment is due to the decrease in the inefficient informal sector workers whose wages were less than the reservation wage even though their contributions to the employers' revenue exceed the opportunity cost of employment. However, note that total employment effect of minimum wage is ambiguous as there is a disemployment effect due to pushed-out firms. We can compare the aggregated amount of employment due to minimum wage increase. Equation (D3.1) and (D3.2) are aggregated amount of formal sector workers without/with minimum wage. If we define $\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_1} = sup\{\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)|p \in \Gamma\}$ and $\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_2} = sup\{\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)|\omega_{min}, p \in \Gamma\}$.

(D3.1) $\int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_1}} n_z dF_z(y)dT(z) = \int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_1}} \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(y)}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y)))(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(y)))} dF_z(y)dT(z)$

(D3.2) $\int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\kappa\omega_{min}}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_2}} n_z dF_z(y)dT(z) = \int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\kappa\omega_{min}}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_2}} \frac{k_z^i m_z D_z(y)}{(1+k_z^i(1-F_z(y)))(1+k_z^e(1-F_z(y)))} dF_z(y)dT(z)$

Minimum wage increase has a positive (negative) employment effect if

$$\int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\kappa\omega_{min}}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_2}} n_z dF_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z)dT(z) \gtrless \int_{\underline{z}}^{\overline{z}} \int_{\underline{R}_z}^{\widetilde{\omega}_z^{sup_1}} n_z dF_z(\widetilde{\omega}_z)dT(z).$$

Q.E.D. □

Proof of Proposition 5: From Proposition 2, we also know that the minimum wage hike does not increase the wage distribution by the same magnitude of the minimum wage increase.

$$\frac{\partial\widetilde{\omega}_z(p)}{\partial\omega_m} = \left[z\frac{\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\right)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))}{\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\right)\left(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\right)}\right]\left[\frac{Q_z\left(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}\right)}{Q_z(p)}\right] < 1$$

Combining with proposition 4, we can deduce that the minimum wage increase generates a higher non-compliance ratio to the minimum wage law in the formal sector.

$Q.E.D.$ □

Proof of Proposition 6: As equation (9) establishes that $\widetilde{\omega}_z^*(p)$ monotonically increases in p, we only need to show that an increase in wage due to a minimum wage hike decreases in p.

$$\frac{\frac{\partial\widetilde{\omega}_z(p)}{\partial\omega_{min}}}{\partial p} = -z\frac{\left(k_z^i J_z'(p)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))+k_z^e J_z'(p)\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\right)\right)Q_z(p)+\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(p))\right)(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(p)))Q_z'(p)}{[Q_z(p)]^2}*$$

$$\frac{Q_z\left(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}\right)}{\left(1+k_z^i(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\right)\left(1+k_z^e(1-J_z(\frac{\kappa\omega_m}{z}))\right)} < 0$$

$Q.E.D.$ □

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Table A.1. Proportion of Job Finding Mechanism

	All workers		All formal sector workers	
	2007	2014	2007	2014
Through government job fairs	0.084	0.065	0.066	0.053
Through private job fairs	0.026	0.018	0.035	0.027
School/University job fairs	0.014	0.009	0.015	0.010
Responded to job advertisement	0.034	0.023	0.050	0.032
Contacted company	0.164	0.182	0.212	0.226
Through friends/relatives	0.481	0.488	0.485	0.503
Contacted by company	0.196	0.206	0.136	0.139
Outsourcing/Recruitment Agencies	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.010
Employment Bureau	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Total	1	1	1	1

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2007,2014)

Table A.2. Real Monthly Minimum Wages by Province and Year

	MW/Median Wage[1]			MW/Median Wage[2]			MW/Median Profit[3]		
	2000	2007	2014	2000	2007	2014	2000	2007	2014
North Sumatera	0.770	0.951	0.837	0.996	1.522	1.506	1.270	1.668	2.259
West Sumatera	0.667	0.841	0.834	0.628	1.250	1.241	1.333	1.793	1.863
South Sumatera	0.543	0.867	1.188	0.912	1.013	2.400	1.900	1.891	3.000
Lampung	0.886	0.994	1.523	0.960	1.110	2.099	1.317	1.480	1.999
DKI Jakarta	0.715	0.700	0.999	0.953	1.632	1.555	0.953	1.166	2.441
West Java	0.719	0.527	0.544	1.533	1.433	1.747	1.533	1.074	1.667
Middle Java	0.910	1.000	0.919	1.850	2.008	1.680	1.755	2.500	1.950
Yogyakarta	0.973	0.767	0.824	0.519	0.794	1.404	2.223	1.903	2.197
East Java	0.894	0.715	0.800	2.356	1.747	2.222	1.430	1.495	1.589
Banten		0.641	0.513		2.335	1.767		1.764	2.208
Bali	0.713	0.889	0.721	0.504	1.333	0.979	1.427	1.866	2.273
NTB	1.200	1.650	1.338	1.210	1.650	2.420	1.440	1.833	1.370
South Kalimantan	0.667	0.742	0.774	1.154	1.292	1.584	1.333	1.625	2.268
South Sulawesi	0.800	1.346	1.200	0.500	1.496	2.139	1.500	3.048	3.086
Overall	0.805	0.806	0.854	1.362	1.558	1.872	1.512	1.772	2.037

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014).
[1] Ratio of minimum wage to median wage of full-time formal sector workers for each province
[2] Ratio of minimum wage to median wage of part-time formal sector workers for each province
[3] Ratio of minimum wage to median wage of informal sector workers for each province

Table A.3. Summary Statistics for Non-Compliance Ratio

	Firm Size[1]	Education Level[2]
Group 1	0.760 [0.427]	0.811 [0.392]
Group 2	0.576 [0.494]	0.665 [0.472]
Group 3	0.423 [0.494]	0.585 [0.493]
Group 4	0.329 [0.470]	0.372 [0.483]
Group 5	0.326 [0.469]	0.203 [0.402]
Total	0.462	0.462

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014).
Notes: We divide sample of formal sector workers into 5 groups based on firm size and education level accordingly.
[1] Group 1 comprises of workers in the firm whose size is between 0 and 4; group 2 between 5 and 19; group 3 between 20 and 99; group 4 between 100 and 200; group 5 more than 200.
[2] Group 1 comprises of workers with less than elementary school education; group 2 with elementary school; group 3 with middle school; group 4 with high school; and group 5 more than high school

Table C.1. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment Status (Migration)

VARIABLES	(1) Formal		(2) Full-Time Formal		(3) Part-Time Formal		(4) Self-Employed		(5) Family Business	
Individual FE	0.039		0.019		0.070***		0.029		-0.046	
	(0.035)		(0.031)		(0.019)		(0.040)		(0.044)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	0.294***	0.039	0.314***	-0.028	-0.019	0.000	-0.258***	-0.040	-0.269***	-0.043
	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.044)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.082)	(0.040)	(0.078)	(0.065)
30 miles	0.316***	0.045	0.332***	0.014	-0.003	-0.003	-0.273***	-0.026	-0.294***	-0.039
	(0.095)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.098)	(0.046)	(0.093)	(0.062)
35 miles	0.267**	0.080	0.283***	0.041	-0.010	-0.016	-0.223**	-0.045	-0.253**	-0.083
	(0.104)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.100)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.072)
40 miles	0.280**	0.070	0.301***	0.042	-0.023	-0.033	-0.259**	-0.049	-0.270**	-0.080
	(0.118)	(0.073)	(0.093)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.121)	(0.068)	(0.116)	(0.069)
60 miles	0.237***	0.109*	0.287***	0.082***	-0.045***	-0.004	-0.195***	-0.068	-0.235***	-0.123**
	(0.083)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.084)	(0.053)
Mean	0.406		0.279		0.133		0.493		0.575	
Observation	47,490		47,490		47,490		47,490		47,490	

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)
Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where the dependent variable is the binary indicator for individuals who work in the category in the column heading. We define respondents who work either in the government or private sector as formal sector workers (Formal). Among them, respondents working more than 40 hours are defined as full-time workers (Full-Time Formal). Respondents working less than 40 hours are defined as part-time workers (Part-Time Formal). Respondents whose working status are either self-employed or self-employed with family members are categorized as self-employed (Self-Employed). We include unpaid family workers to the previous category to define Family Business. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) majority of time spent on job during the week, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.

Table C.2. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Income by Employment Status (Migration)

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Full-Time Wage Earner									
	All		Sub-Minimum Wage Workers Initial Year		Over-Minimum Wage Workers Initial Year		Part-Time Wage Earner		Self-Employed Profit Earner	
Individual FE	0.404**		0.593***		0.336***		-0.245		0.188	
	(0.150)		(0.159)		(0.131)		(0.366)		(0.153)	
	SD	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**	**SD**	**DSD**
25 miles	1.156***	0.823***	1.120***	0.819***	0.818***	1.089***	0.689	-0.031	0.754**	0.420
	(0.263)	(0.223)	(0.237)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.198)	(0.470)	(0.487)	0.345	0.371
30 miles	1.487***	1.086***	1.383***	1.290***	0.960***	1.152***	1.116**	0.313	0.658*	0.143
	(0.350)	(0.230)	(0.286)	(0.223)	(0.144)	(0.217)	(0.526)	(0.374)	0.338	0.373
35 miles	1.205***	0.932***	1.104***	1.274***	0.852***	0.979***	0.846**	0.454	0.672**	-0.006
	(0.220)	(0.168)	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.120)	(0.176)	(0.366)	(0.284)	0.271	0.268
40 miles	1.145***	0.866***	1.113***	1.359***	0.772***	0.805***	0.662**	0.549**	0.647***	0.020
	(0.191)	(0.130)	(0.189)	(0.231)	(0.099)	(0.180)	(0.323)	(0.252)	0.201	0.167
60 miles	1.081***	0.828***	1.060***	1.185***	0.785***	0.760***	0.603***	0.502**	0.704***	0.069
	(0.089)	(0.127)	(0.145)	(0.215)	(0.082)	(0.136)	(0.186)	(0.223)	0.141	0.079
Mean	15.919		15.066		16.574		15.294		15.073	
Observations	13,016		5,657		7,359		6,157		17,022	

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on log real minimum wages where each dependent variable is the log values of earning for individuals who work in the category in the column heading. We define respondents who work either in the government or private sector as formal sector wage earners. Among them, respondents working more than 40 hours are defined as full-time wage workers. We further divide the sample into the two different groups: respondents whose wage at the initial year of sampling is smaller than minimum wage (Sub-Minimum Wage Workers), and respondents whose wage at the initial year of sampling is higher than minimum wage (Over-Minimum Wage Workers). Respondents working less than 40 hours are defined as part-time workers (Part-Time Formal). Respondents whose working status are self-employed, self-employed with family members or unpaid family workers are defined as family business profit earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) majority of time spent on job during the week, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.

Table C.3. Tests for partial compliance with legal minimum wages (Migration)

	Workers in Medium Firms (5~199) (T) and Large Firms (>200) (C)	
2014 × T	0.065 *	0.073 *
	(0.035)	(0.039)
2007 × T		0.033
		(0.031)
2000 × T		-0.069
		(0.066)
Individual, Year, Occupation FE	Yes	Yes
Macro Variables	Yes	Yes
Number of Observation	9,961	9,961

Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000,2007,2014)

Notes: All estimates are coefficients on the interaction of dummies (treatment group dummy and year dummies) where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for non-compliant. Clustered-robust standard errors by the province in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: log values of household assets, dummy variables for (i) urban/rural residence, (ii) gender status, and (iii) majority of time spent on job during the week, age and age squared, education level and education squared, and log of provincial GDP.